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Can the administration be trusted? 
An analysis of the concept of trust applied to the public sector 
Etienne Fivat, Martial Pasquier 
Introduction 
The positive effects – assumed or demonstrated – of trust have been abundantly dealt with in 
the literature of human sciences, philosophy, psychology, sociology, economics and 
management. 
Generally, trust is a “lubricant” (Arrow, 1974) that facilitates social relations (e.g. Luhmann, 1973; 
Giddens, 1984; Zucker, 1986). From an economics point of view, a high level of trust in an 
institutional environment would be correlated with the performance of the national economy (e.g. 
Dyer and Chu, 2003). Trust, as social capital, would allow and would engender altruistic and 
cooperative behaviours that would have an impact on and sustain a community’s economic 
prosperity (Fukuyama, 1996). In an organizational framework, trust elicits more open 
communication and facilitates exchanges of information (e.g. Smith and Barclay, 1997; Currall 
and Judge, 1995), facilitates conflict management (e.g. Blomqvist, 2002) and shared learning 
(e.g. Bijlsma-Frankema, 2004), or reduces integration costs (e.g. Bidault and Jarillo, 1995). 
Despite the fact that its benefits have been demonstrated many times over, the richness and 
abundance of the notion of trust in organizational literature is equalled only by the glaring lack 
of consensus on the definition of the concept (e.g. Hosmer, 1995, Blomqvist, 1997, Rousseau 
et al., 1998, Seppänen et al., 2007) and how to measure it (e.g. Seppänen et al., 2007, McEvily 
and Tortoriello, 2011, Gillespie, 2012) – particularly as regards the distinction between its 
antecedents and its effects (e.g. Seppänen et al., 2007) and its relationship to control (e.g. 
Möllering, 2005, Gulati and Nickerson, 2008). In a literature review focusing on publications 
devoted to trust between 1962 and 2010, MacEvily and Torentiello (2011) found, in 171 papers 
examined, 129 different measurements of trust. Based on a review of literature between 1982 
and 2009, Akrout and Akrout (2011) observed that – despite the proliferation of studies carried 
out over the past two decades on relations in an organizational context and the open debate in 
economics and managerial sciences on its conceptualization going back more than 50 years 
(e.g. Deutsch, 1958) – trust “remains a relatively blurred and fragmentary concept and in need 
of overall coherence […] the accumulation of definitions, models and measurement scales has 
by no means eliminated the uncertainty and confusion often associated with this concept” 
(Akrout and Akrout, 2011: 2). 
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In the first part of this paper, we present the various academic debates and, where applicable, 
questions that remain open in the literature, particularly regarding the nature of trust, the 
distinction between trust and trustworthiness, its role in specific relationships and its relationship 
to control. We then propose a way of demarcating and operationalizing the concepts of trust and 
trustworthiness.  
In the second part, on the basis of the conceptual clarifications we present, we put forward a 
number of “anchor points” regarding how trust is apprehended in the public sector with regard 
to the various relationships that can be studied. Schematically, we distinguish between two types 
of relationships in the conceptual approach to trust: on one hand, the trust that citizens, or third 
parties, place in the State or in various public sector authorities or entities, and on the other 
hand, trust within the State or the public sector, between its various authorities, entities, and 
actors. While studies have traditionally focused on citizens’ trust in their institutions, the findings, 
limitations and problems observed in public -sector coordination following the reforms 
associated with New Public Management have also elicited growing interest in the study of trust 
in the relationships between the various actors within the public sector. 
Both the theoretical debates we present and our propositions have been extracted and adapted 
from an empirical comparative study of coordination between various Swiss public-service 
organizations and their politico-administrative authority (Fivat, 2013)1. Using the analysis model 
developed for this specific relationship, between various actors within the public service, and in 
the light of theoretical elements on which development of this model was based, we propose 
some avenues for further study – questions that remain open – regarding the consideration and 
understanding of citizens’ trust in the public sector. 
  
                                                     
1 Les effets de la confiance sur les organisations autonomes de service public. Une étude 
comparative. Thèse de doctorat en administration publique de l’Université de Lausanne, Faculté des 
Hautes études commerciales et Institut de Hautes Etudes en Administration Publique, Etienne Fivat 
(filing date: 11 October 2013). http://my.unil.ch/serval/document/BIB_10B797BD1D9C.pdf  
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I. Definition, demarcation and operationalization of 
trust  
In 1997, Blomqvist found that knowledge about how to operationalize trust was at that time 
“meagre”, the measurement of trust often being limited to “how much, if any, a respondent trusts 
the other party“ (1997: 283). This approach falls far short of a holistic apprehension of the 
phenomenon, since trust is peculiar to specific contexts and situations experienced by distinct 
individuals and, hence, “idiosyncratic”: “It is not in fact quite clear whether human beings 
consciously measure trust in their relationships. Parkhe (1993) follows Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1947), who noted that people do not measure trust exactly but that they tend 
rather to conduct their activities in ‘a sphere of considerable haziness’. Nevertheless, the results 
of this blurry measuring are used in people's everyday lives. If we agree with the premise that 
trust represents a considerable economic and social lubricant, the ability to measure trust should 
be of great value both to scientific progress and practical know-how” (Blomqvist, 1997: 284). 
In their 2007 review of the study and measurement of trust in an organizational context between 
1990 and 2003, Seppänen, Blomqvist and Sundqvist identified a very wide variety of 
conceptualizations and operationalizations of trust. However, for no clear reason, no consensus 
emerges on method: “If studies based on the same theories apply different conceptualizations, 
then the theoretical coverage of the concept itself might be inadequate: it would thus need more 
research, first theoretical and only then empirical. Because of the suggested high context-
specificity, and due to the fact that the concept of trust is apparently not easily quantifiable, it 
seems obvious that qualitative empirical studies and piloting are also called for before 
quantitative surveys are carried out” (Seppänen et al., 2007: 261). Lewicki, Tomlinson and 
Gillespie (2006) underline the complexity of perceptions and assessments at play in the 
emergence and evolution of trust and note the limitations of a “reductionist” approach (Lewis 
and Weigert, 1985a): “the rich meaning that may be latent behind the number is inaccessible” 
(Lewicki et al., 2006: 1015). A challenge facing research on trust is therefore to study how trust 
is created, felt and signalled: the way in which it develops and manifests itself (Blomqvist, 2002, 
Lewicki et al., 2006, Seppänen et al., 2007). The usefulness of a holistic approach to the study 
of trust, encompassing the various associated components and their evolution, and in its duality 
with control (Möllering, 2005), was put forward by Ping Li (2011) in his inaugural article in the 
Journal of Trust Research. 
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1. The nature of trust 
“Trust combines good reasons with faith” (Simmel, 1908, quoted by Möllering, 2001: 411). 
Trust is intrinsically bound up with free will – an individual’s free will and the uncertainty deriving 
from that of others. In allowing uncertainty to be tolerated, in authorizing the taking of decisions 
in a situation of uncertainty, “trust, in the broadest sense of confidences in one’s expectation, is 
a basic fact of social life” (Luhmann, 1979: 4). 
The definitions and approaches to trust most frequently cited in managerial literature (e.g. Lewis 
and Weigert, 1985a, Mayer et al., 1995, Lane and Bachman, 1998) show the influence of the 
work of Niklas Luhmann (1973, 1979, 1988), who was himself influenced by Georg Simmel 
(Möllering, 2001). The freedom of human action means that virtually any behaviour can be 
adopted by any of the partners involved in an interaction. Consequently they must face risk and 
uncertainty before being able to interact. 
In Luhmann’s theory of systems, trust plays an essential role in enabling interaction between 
individuals. Trust is addressed in laws and institutions (expert systems), which provide 
guarantees concerning the behaviour of individuals, and in norms and expectations regarding 
interpersonal interactions. Trust, based on shared social expectations, makes for a reduction in 
the complexity of one’s environment and an increase in its predictability by reducing uncertainty 
regarding the behaviour of actors. Preconditions for trust include on one hand a certain amount 
of information about the actor in whom an individual may potentially place his trust and the 
situation, and risk on the other hand. 
Without making them completely separate, Luhmann (1988, 2001) distinguishes between 
confidence (Zutrauen) and trust (Vertrauen). Both concepts involve expectations that may not 
be fulfilled, but differ as regards perception and attribution. In a situation of confidence, an 
individual does not envisage any alternative (Luhmann gives the example of leaving one’s house 
every morning unarmed). The action is chosen despite the possibility of being disappointed by 
the action of others. In the event of disappointed expectations, an individual will react by external 
attributions. Trust, on the other hand, involves a prior engagement by the individual. It 
presupposes a situation of risk and, in the event of disappointed expectations, the individual will 
react with internal attributions (will regret having chosen to trust). The distinction between 
confidence and trust depends on the ability to distinguish between dangers and risks2. The 
distinction does not involve questions of probability, whether remote or immediate: it involves 
knowing whether the possibility of disappointment depends on our own prior conduct (Luhmann, 
2006). 
                                                     
2 Danger implies a situation in which a person is threatened, whereas risk implies a possible danger 
inherent in that person's decision. 
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Trust therefore involves risk: placing one’s trust means taking a risk (Luhmann, 1988). However, 
risk does not exist in isolation: it emerges only as a component of a decision and an action3: “If 
you refrain from action you run no risk. It is a purely internal calculation of external conditions 
which creates risk” (Luhmann, 1988: 100). In other words, trust is based on a circular relationship 
between risk and action, both being complementary requirements: “Action defines itself in 
relation to a particular risk as external (future) possibility, although risk at the same time is 
inherent in action and exists only if the actor chooses to incur the chance of unfortunate 
consequences and to trust. […] risk represents a re-entry of the difference between controllable 
and uncontrollable into the controllable” (Luhmann, 1988: 100). Although Luhmann puts forward 
the idea that trust is an effective (successful) response to the problem of complexity, it does not 
eliminate complexity, but merely reduces it. Trust allows us to “live with” complexity, while in a 
way preserving it (Möllering, 2001). For Luhmann, the foundations of trust cannot reside solely 
in cognitive capacities, but in a “type of system of internal “suspension” (Aufhebung)” (Luhmann, 
1979: 79, in Möllering, 2001: 409). Trust is thus a risky investment to the extent that it is 
extrapolated from available information (Luhmann, 1979). 
It follows that trust is necessary because knowledge, information, is imperfect (e.g. Lewis and 
Weigert, 1985a, Blomqvist, 1997), but trust is nevertheless based on certain items of 
information. Granovetter borrows the words of Georg Simmel: “[…] the person who knows 
completely need not trust; while the person who knows nothing, can on no rational grounds 
afford even confidence” (Granovetter, 1992a: 39, in Blomqvist, 1997: 272). “Thus in total 
ignorance it is possible only to have faith and/or gamble” (Blomqvist, 1997: 272). The other side 
of the coin is that uncertainty is also a basis for caution and suspicion (Luhmann, 2006). 
What gives meaning and importance to trust is that it is established in the process in which our 
interpretations are accepted and in which our awareness of the unknown, the unknowable and 
the unresolved is suspended (Giddens, 1991). This suspension makes trust “both more and less 
than knowledge” (Simmel, 1990: 179), even standing “outside the categories of knowledge and 
ignorance” (Simmel, 1950: 318, in Möllering, 2001: 414). 
The foundation of Möllering’s proposition (2001, 2005) lies in the work of Georg Simmel, 
particularly in its taking up the notion of suspension, and in its explicit or implicit influence on the 
treatment of trust (particularly Luhmann, 1979, Lewis and Weigert, 1985a, Giddens, 1990). His 
proposition focuses on the trustor, his interpretation of the environment and the mental process 
of trust. According to Möllering (2001) whether or not one places trust in future events, the 
perception and evaluation of risk is a highly subjective matter4. 
                                                     
3 Confidence, on the other hand, emerges in situations characterized by contingency and danger, 
which makes it meaningful to reflect on pre-adaptive and protective measures. The source of 
disappointment may be social action. Anticipation therefore differentiates between social actors. 
(Luhmann, 1988: 99) 
4 To the extent that these good reasons lie with the trustor, his approach is not explicitly and separately 
concerned with the trustee’s trustworthiness, individual dispositions or the situation. Yet trust is always 
extrapolated by the trustor from available information. 
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For Möllering (2001), the challenge in research on trust is to embrace and translate the three 
elements of trust – interpretation, suspension and expectation: 
1. The process of trust begins with interpretation (the input side of the trust process). This 
involves investigating the “good reasons” from the individual’s point of view (Möllering, 
2001), his interpretation of the situation. Möllering adds that “trust is inherently reflexive, 
because for every favourable ‘good reason’ there exists probably another unfavourable for 
trust”. The “trick is not just to be able to live with weak interpretative knowledge of one kind 
or another, but to suspend contradiction and ignorance as well” (Möllering, 2001: 415). 
2. Suspension (from interpretation to expectations) is the “mental leap” of trust, the 
psychological process that introduces an individual to take a risk, “extrapolated from 
available information” (Luhmann, 1979: 24). Methodologically, suspension could be 
conceived of as the reverse of interpretation. It is a question of grasping what constitutes a 
lack of knowledge or the unknowable from the point of view of the trustor (Möllering, 2001). 
Although interpretation and suspension always “combine,” “interpretations do not translate 
directly into expectations” (Möllering, 2001: 414-415). 
3. Expectations about the actions and intentions of third parties must be considered as the 
output side of the process of trust5. They can be favourable in the case of trust, or 
conversely unfavourable in case of distrust. This state can become an input for action, but 
its effects must not be confounded with trust.  
  
                                                     
5 For Rousseau et al. (1998) and the many authors who take up their definition of trust, positive 
expectations manifest, or at least surround trust, but it does not seem to us that they are explicitly 
considered as an output of trust (see below). 
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Figure 1: The trust process (adapted from Möllering, 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
An understanding of trust cannot therefore miss out any of these three elements: interpretation, 
suspension, (favourable) expectations. Ultimately it is a question of comprehending the 
subjective reasons that enable the trustor to act, that is, to intend to take a risk. The fundamental 
question is the individual’s capacity to establish favourable expectations of partners to whom he 
is vulnerable and, in focusing on the risk, the issue inevitably comes down to his relationship 
with control: “The concept of suspension addresses the issue that either side of the trust/control 
duality as well as the duality as such always leaves the actor with irreducible social uncertainty 
and doubt, which means that we cannot assume full certainty with regard to the actions of actors 
either” (Möllering, 2005: 295). 
Möllering, then, conceives of the roles of control and trust as a duality: “trust and control each 
assume the existence of the other, refer to each other and create each other, but remain 
irreducible to each other” (2005: 284). The key to the connection between trust and control 
essentially lies in the creation of positive expectations. Purely theoretically one can speak of 
control when an actor bases positive expectations on the fact that the other party is constrained 
(Leifer and Mills, 1996) and of trust when positive expectations are based on the conjecture that 
the other party is benevolent, in other words, is favourably disposed towards us (Zand, 1972, 
Gambetta, 1988, Rousseau et al., 1998): “In common parlance, speaking of a trust/control 
duality means to say, first, that you cannot have one without the other: ‘each usually requires 
the existence of the other’ (Sydow and Windeler, 2003: 69, in Möllering, 2005: 290)”. In other 
words, positive expectations are possible when the other party is constrained to some extent 
and makes use of his discretion, or whatever freedom remains to him, in a manner that is not 
prejudicial (e.g. Hagen and Choe, 1998). More positively, “when an actor is structurally 
empowered and individually benevolent, this gives others a basis for positive expectations” (e.g. 
Jepperson, 1991)” (Möllering, 2005: 288). 
Fundamentally, the very essence of the concept of trust raises two types of questions and major 
problems of operationalization. First, how is one to assess a psychological state that is “highly 
subjective” and partially rational, a state of “suspension”? When does trust begin? Second, 
where is the operationalization “cursor” to be positioned? Interpretation, suspension and 
expectations are distinct steps, but dependent on the trust process. Without necessarily being 
explicit, the position taken with regard to these questions largely explains the diversity of 
approaches found in the literature. 
suspension (favourable) expectations interpretation 
The trust process 
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1.1. Trust in economics and managerial literature  
Schematically, managerial literature dealing with trust in an organizational context looks at its 
effects on induced behaviour on one hand, and on the other focuses on its conditions of 
emergence, which are seen as antecedents of or as dimensions of trust. 
In summary, the probabilistic approach puts forward a “calculative” approach to trust and 
focuses on its behavioural manifestation. In contrast, the psychological approach opposes a 
purely rational nature of trust and focuses on the processes at work in its emergence. At the 
heart of this approach, so-called transformational approaches posit a dynamic evolution of trust 
in a relationship: the very nature of trust changes and, with it, its intensity. By situating trust 
societally, sociology contextualizes trust, lending it a “supra-relational” dimension: trust becomes 
part of shared norms, becomes intersubjective, guiding and supporting behaviours. Lastly, some 
authors, such as Sako and Helper and Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and Camerer, propose a definition 
of trust that integrates or takes inspiration from the characteristics of these different approaches. 
1.1.1. The probabilistic approach  
The probabilistic or behavioural approach to trust, used in game theory for example, sees 
cooperative behaviour as an acceptable manifestation of trust (Axelrod, 1984, Flores and 
Solomon, 1998). To cooperate or not to cooperate is a rational choice if it presumes an 
advantageous return from cooperation, all the more so if the action is repeated many times or if 
the timeframe is indeterminate (Kreps, 1990). The increase in the level of trust is a function of 
reciprocal cooperative behaviour. It declines drastically when the other party decides not to 
collaborate (e.g. Deutsch, 1958, Lindskold, 1978, Axelrod, 1984). Nevertheless, the calculative 
nature of trust maintains “ambiguous” relationships with the rationality (whether instrumental or 
procedural) of microeconomic theories (e.g. Williamson, 1993, Trepo et al., 1998): “When trust 
is justified by expectations of positive reciprocal consequences, it is simply another version of 
economic exchange, as is clear from treatments of trust as reputation in repeated games” 
(March and Olsen, 1989: 27). 
1.1.2. The psychological approach 
Without setting aside the behavioural aspect of trust in its conative dimension, the psychological 
tradition of trust essentially differs from the behavioural approach in its rational aspect that leads 
to action. The emphasis is on understanding the psychological processes that shape, or alter, 
the trustor’s choices (e.g. Lewicki et al., 2006) in a specific relationship.  
Trust is presented as a functional alternative to calculation, which “begins where predictions 
end” (Lewis and Weigert, 1985a: 976): “Trust is a functional alternative to rational prediction for 
the reduction of complexity. Indeed, trust succeeds where rational prediction alone would fail, 
because to trust is to live as if certain rationally possible futures will not occur. Thus trust reduces 
complexity far more quickly, economically, and thoroughly than does prediction” (Lewis and 
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Weigert, 1985a: 969). The authors add an affective dimension: “Trusting behaviour may be 
motivated primarily by strong positive affect for the object of trust or by 'good rational reasons' 
why the object of trust merits trust, or, more usually, some combination of both. Trust in everyday 
life is a mix of feeling and rational thinking” (ibid.: 972). Lewis and Weigert’s (1985a) definition 
implies that trust develops not only through a process of rational thought (cognitive-based), but 
also out of feelings or intuitions (affect-based). The cognitive subfactor of trust involves 
perceptions of the other party’s trustworthiness: “First, trust is based on a cognitive process 
which discriminates among persons and institutions that are trustworthy, distrusted, and 
unknown. In this sense we cognitively choose whom we will trust in which respects and under 
which circumstances, and we base the choice on what we take to be ‘good reasons’, constituting 
evidence of trustworthiness” (Lewis and Weigert, 1985a: 970). For McAllister (1995), “cognition-
based trust” is necessary for the reduction of uncertainty. It lays the foundations on which the 
“leap of faith” (e.g. Möllering, 2001), when parties “suspend their beliefs that the other party is 
not to be trusted” (Jones and George, 1998: 536), can occur “beyond the expectations that 
reason and experience alone would warrant” (Lewis and Weigert, 1985a: 970). The emotional 
basis proposed by Lewis and Weigert (1985a) is distinct from, but complementary to, the 
cognitive basis (e.g. Lewicki et al., 2006). It approaches belief in others, the belief that another 
can and wishes to act positively. In the view of McAllister (1995), “affect-based trust” is founded 
on an emotional bond between the parties.  
Many authors make a distinction of varying degree between different “types” of trust, its cognitive 
basis remaining calculative rather than a noncalculative dimension (Ring and Ven, 1994, Lane 
and Bachmann, 1996, Ring, 1996, Rousseau et al., 1998, Sako and Helper, 1998). Nooteboom 
et al. (1997), for example, provide a probabilistic description of the nature of trust, as follows: “X 
trusts Y, to the extent that X chooses to cooperate with Y on the basis of a subjective probability 
that Y will choose not to employ opportunities for defection that X considers damaging, even if 
it is even if it is in the interests of Y to do so” (1997: 315), whereas non-calculus-based trust is 
“a noncalculative reliance in the moral integrity, or goodwill, of others on whom economic actors 
depend for the realization of collective and individual goals when they deal with future, 
unpredictable issues” (Ring, 1996: 156). Ring (1996) terms these two types of trust respectively 
as fragile and resilient. In Madhok (1995), fragile trust constitutes structural trust, essential in 
the building of a relationship, but is not a sufficient condition for its continuity (Delerue and 
Brérard, 2007). Some consider that, when speaking of trust, only its noncalculative dimension 
should be considered (e.g. Brattström and Richtnér, 2010). 
1.1.3. The transformational approach  
In the psychological approach, research most often focuses on the characteristics that the trustor 
relies on (Lewicki et al., 2006), the various “sources” of trustworthiness, which go into making 
up the “good reasons” for placing trust. The cognitive basis of trust preferably involves the 
perception of the other party’s characteristics, intrinsic qualities, whereas its non-calculative 
basis depends on the history, the experience of the relationship. Within the psychological 
approach, authors who espouse the so-called “transformational” approach to trust (Lewicki et 
al., 2006) propose a diachronic evolution of types of trust: the very nature of trust changes over 
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time (e.g. Shapiro et al., 1992, Lewicki and Bunker, 1995, Lewicki and Bunker, 1996, Rousseau 
et al., 1998, Das and Teng, 2001). The models of Shapiro et al. (1992) and of Lewicki and 
Bunker (1995, 1996) seek to understand, in a transactional situation (that is, in a situation of 
interdependence and hence of vulnerability) the phenomenology of the construction and 
evolution of the nature of trust. How can “deep” trust in a “business relationship”, as opposed to 
romantic and personal relationships, be built (e.g. Boon and Holmes, 1991, Lewicki et al., 2006)? 
Shapiro et al. (1992), then Lewicki and Bunker (1995, 1996), for example, propose three stages 
in the construction and evolution of trust in a relationship, initially based on deterrence or 
calculus, then on knowledge, and lastly on identification of the parties. 
From trust based on deterrence and calculus…  
The first stage (deterrence-based trust) forms part of the behavioural approach presented 
above. Authors follow the approach of Deutsch (1958), who defines trust as an individual’s 
positive attitude towards the results of an event in an ambiguous situation. For Deutsch, trust 
ensues from a (ir)rational choice that a person makes faced with the uncertainty of an event 
potentially leading to much higher losses than gains: “(the trusting person) perceives that he will 
be worse off if he trusts and his trust is not fulfilled than if he does not trust” (Deutsch, 1958: 
266). Deutsch points out: “Trusting behaviour occurs when an individual perceives an 
ambiguous path, the result of which could be good or bad, and the occurrence of the good or 
bad result is contingent on the actions of another person; finally, the bad result is more harming 
than the good result is beneficial. If the individual chooses to go down that path, he can be said 
to have made a trusting choice, if not, he is distrustful. (...)” (Deutsch, 1962: 303). In the view of 
Shapiro et al. (1992), there is no immediate mutual advantage in trust. Trust exists only when 
the benefits of maintaining the relationship are greater than the short-term benefits of defection. 
Trusting behaviours are sustained only by the potential negative consequences of not keeping 
trust, that is, deterrence (ibid.: 366). Trust is therefore conceived as a response to, a “mechanism 
against”, vulnerability. Over the course of repeated interactions, the knowledge of and the 
perceived predictability of the other party reinforce the basis of trust. In a final stage, trust 
appears to be based on identification of the partners, the internalization of the other party’s 
preferences (ibid.). This model suggests that the initial level of trust is “above zero”, with trust 
initially being built on “reputation as hostage” (threatening the potential trust breaker with 
reputation damage within his or her professional network if trust is broken) (Lewicki et al., 2006: 
1009). 
Following the work of Shapiro et al. (1992), Lewicki and Bunker (1995, 1996) propose extending 
and reinforcing the explanation of the causal dynamics of each “base” and the sequences of the 
various stages over time. 
The first stage was renamed calculus-based trust in order to show that “this type of trust is 
grounded not just in vulnerability but also in the benefits to be gained from various forms of 
transactions in relationships” (Lewicki et al., 2006: 1011). The authors referred to Williamson 
(1975, 1981), whose position regarding trust is still debated in the literature. In his first work on 
transaction costs, trust is seen not as an independent regulating mechanism, but as a support 
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mechanism complementing traditional market or hierarchical mechanisms. He posits the 
concept of an “atmosphere” in which transactions take place. In an organization, employees can 
exhibit either perfunctory or consummate cooperation (Williamson, 1975). Later, Williamson 
(1993) essentially considers that the concept of trust is misused in respect of phenomena that 
can be explained by rational calculation, and also that “noncalculative” trust is not required to 
explain economic behaviour.  Although Williamson (1993) allows the existence of relationships 
of trust in social and personal exchanges, in his view, bringing trust into business relations sows 
confusion. If he considers the concept of trust to be redundant, meaningless, even “useless”6, 
since any transaction can be reduced to calculating the cost/benefits ratio of a relationship and 
individual decisions are motivated solely by the risk/opportunity calculation, this is because the 
calculative rationality favoured by transaction-cost theory is opposed to the construction of an 
endogenous theory of trust (e.g. Baudry, 1999)7. In relationships between actors, formal 
contracts or institutional frameworks are substitutes for trust (Ghertman, 2006), and trust is 
merely calculative and reduced to the attainment of individual interests. In other words, no trust 
is involved, but rather an absence of immediate opportunistic behaviour. If trust is not calculative, 
it can only be blind and have little chance of surviving in the market (Williamson, 1993). 
Yet this is the very phenomenon proposed by Lewicki and Bunker (1995, 1996). As its name 
implies, calculus-based trust is based on rational calculation. In the language of transaction 
costs, not showing oneself to be opportunistic maximizes wealth in the long term. In other words, 
if agents do not exploit loopholes in contracts or institutional frameworks, it is because other 
constraints (the repetition of interactions, reputation, etc.) will sanction them in the long term, 
and agents can establish a comparison between the benefits of loyalty and those of defection 
(Brousseau, 2000). For Lewicki and Bunker (1995, 1996), some relationships will not go beyond 
this stage. Either because there is no need, since the relationship is sufficiently defined and 
regulated (meaning that the level of control does not necessitate recourse to a “deeper” form of 
trust), or because the information obtained on the parties and/or their trustworthiness provides 
no incentive to take the relationship of trust further. 
…Towards trust based on knowledge, and then identification 
The two types of trust proposed by Lewicki and Bunker (1995, 1996), labelled knowledge-based 
trust and identification-based trust respectively, are essentially identical to those of Shapiro et 
al. (1992). Lewicki and Bunker’s construction (1995, 1996) emphasizes, in the shift from one 
type of trust to the other, knowledge of the other party learned through varied, repeated 
interactions. This learning does not focus solely on the discovery of the other party’s intrinsic 
qualities, but also on his interests, preferences and reactions, supported by the resulting 
predictability (Lewicki et al., 2006). 
                                                     
6 However, reputation, the essence of institutional trust, can be the starting point for the formation of 
a partnership relationship, formalized through a contract, a vehicle of formal control (Williamson, 
1993). 
7 The point of view adopted is rationalist, since human behavioural characteristics are defined as 
opportunistic and rational, even though the rationality is limited (Rizza, 2008). 
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Moving from calculative trust to trust based on knowledge, the parties move from concentrating 
on their differences and contrasts, together with the risks associated with potentially 
opportunistic behaviour, to concentrating on what they have in common (assimilation). From 
trust based on knowledge to trust based on identification, the parties create a balance between 
the strengthening of a shared identity and the maintenance of their own identity in the 
relationship. The authors refer to Rusbult et al. (1999): over time, the parties in a close 
relationship shift their focus from maximizing their own interests to maximizing shared results: 
“trust moves through three stages: predictability (consistency of partner behaviour) to 
dependability (reliability and honesty), and finally to a ‘leap of faith’, grounded in ‘a conviction 
that the partner can be relied upon to be responsive to one’s needs in a caring manner, now 
and in the future’” (ibid.: 442). 
Lewicki and Bunker (1995, 1996) describe shifts from one type of trust to the other, the 
“transformation points”, as “frame changes,” fundamental shifts in the dominant paradigm of 
interpersonal relations (Lewicki et al., 2006: 1012). In the authors’ view, only a small proportion 
of relationships develop identification-based trust. The parties share interests, values and 
intentions: “One party can serve as an agent for the other, because he or she knows that they 
have interests in common and one’s own interests will be protected or advocated by the other” 
(Lewicki et al., 2006: 1010). 
By making the relational dimension the focus of their analysis, these approaches incorporate 
social elements in trust-related choices: “their broader emphasis on social rather than purely 
instrumental (resource-based) motives driving trust behaviour, including consideration of how 
actors self-presentational concerns and identity-related needs and motives influence trust-
related cognition and choice” (Kramer, 1999: 572). Kramer (1999) sees sociology’s contribution 
to trust as the initial impetus for these relational models, in particular in the work of Granovetter 
(1985) and the social embeddedness of economic transactions, which is essentially opposed to 
the pursuit of self-interest by rational, more or less atomized individuals of the “new institutional 
economics” (North and Thomas, 1973, Williamson, 1975). 
1.1.4. The contributions of sociology 
The main proponent of economic sociology, Granovetter (1985) takes up the notion of 
embeddedness8: economic relationships between individuals or organizations are “embedded” 
in networks of interpersonal or social relationships and do not exist in an abstract, idealized 
concept of the market. The network is largely founded on social forms such as belonging, 
community, or norms of reciprocity. Organizations cannot therefore be analyzed in strictly 
economic terms. Wider issues, including social dimensions, must be taken into account: the 
forms of organizations, resulting from concrete interactions between real actors, taking place in 
                                                     
8 Introduced by Karl Polanyi (1957), this notion holds that individual interest has not been dominant 
in human history, due to the importance of preserving social connections and community obligations 
(Rizza, 2008). 
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a singular sociopolitical environment, taking into account historic processes and the 
transformation of organizations (Amblard, 2005). The structure of institutions influences 
individual economic behaviour and constrains the choices that actors can make.  
The notion of trust thus becomes central. The concept of embeddedness emphasizes the role 
of personal relations and network structures in eliciting trust and discouraging opportunism: 
“where this embedding is in fact absent, and many individuals appear to be rational profit 
maximizers, approximating the ‘under-socialized’ model of human action […], economic activity 
is often stymied by lack of the interpersonal trust required to delegate authority” (Granovetter, 
1992b: 7). From this viewpoint, economic theory ignores agents’ identity and past relationships, 
whereas the introduction of economic transactions into interpersonal networks is the main origin 
of trust and allows better sharing of information (without ruling out the possibility of opportunistic 
behaviour). The emphasis is thus no longer on trust as a facilitator of transactions, but on trust 
for the role it plays in concrete personal relations, which are built up in a network, which have a 
history and which penetrate to a certain depth into economic life (Neveu, 2004). Trust is 
therefore a byproduct of the embeddedness of parties, who share a common societal or cultural 
standard (Granovetter, 1985). In this approach, trust has a “supra-relational” component: it is 
situated in society and forms part of a series of values, beliefs and social expectations shared 
by the parties involved in an exchange. 
The study of trust, then, focuses less on its intrinsic nature and more on its role in interpersonal 
relations, in economic exchanges and on the dynamic it creates within institutions. Lynne 
Zucker9 (1986) distinguishes between three sources that give rise to three distinct forms of trust: 
process-based trust, based on participants’ regular exchanges; characteristic-based trust, 
founded on norms of obligation or cooperation attached to appearances or social similarities of 
a person or group of individuals; and institutional-based trust, which is attached to a formal 
structure guaranteeing the specific attributes of an individual or an organization. Trust is then 
conceived of in its institutional dimension: the environment in which the exchange occurs. Zucker 
(1986) institutional-based trust as a reconstruction of locally produced trust: “Locally produced 
trust must be reconstructed as intersubjective, exterior to any given situation, and as part of the 
‘external world known in common’, objective in that they are repeatable by other individuals 
without changing the common understanding of the acts” (Zucker, 1986: 63). Trust moves from 
being interpersonal to being intersubjective. Zucker distinguishes two types: the first is specific 
to a person or an organization, and the second is granted to intermediaries. The first type of 
trust is characterized by a set of signals that enable the second protagonist to reduce the field 
of the signal sender’s possible actions. The second refers to “guarantees” offered by 
intermediaries (the legal framework, for example), delegation to a higher authority1011. 
                                                     
9 Zucker focused on trust in considering the historical reasons that explain the transformations of 
economic structures in the United States between 1840 and 1920. 
10 Based on a formal social structure that guarantees the attributes of a person or an organization, 
such as a code of ethics, contracts or laws (Zucker, 1986) 
11 This dimension is close to Shapiro’s (1987) “institutional side bets”. Zucker proposes substitution 
of relational trust with institutional trust, while Shapiro suggests that intentions to trust at the start of 
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Fukuyama (1996) sees trust as “the cement of society.” Trust is “the expectation that arises 
within the community of regular, honest, and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared 
norms, on the part of other members of the community” (Fukuyama, 1996: 26). The capacity to 
cooperate is thus partly determined by the quality of the social fabric within which the actors 
move. An institutional environment enjoying a high level of trust would be highly correlated with 
the efficiency of the national economy (e.g. Dyer and Chu, 2003). Fukuyama contends that a 
nation’s economic prosperity, “as well as its ability to compete, is conditioned by […] the level of 
trust inherent in the society” (1996: 7). Trust as social capital would generate spontaneous 
sociability. As regards behaviours, spontaneous sociability implies a host of altruistic, 
cooperative and “extra-role” behaviours by members of society that would increase the collective 
wellbeing and the accomplishment of collective goals. In an organizational context, members 
are expected, for example, to invest in the accomplishment of shared objectives, to share useful 
information, or to use organizational resources parsimoniously. For Fukuyama (1996), trust is a 
central factor in the development of large organizations: by reducing doubt, trust reduces the 
costs of control and risk.  
Seen very schematically, sociology’s contribution to trust places it societally, situating it in a 
historic, interactive context. In other words, it adds another dimension to trust that is defined 
solely in opposition to individual, opportunistic behaviour of independent individuals: trust thus 
becomes a shared norm that guides and supports behaviours. The psychological approach to 
trust presented above adds to a purely cognitive and calculative approach to the essence of the 
psychological process that gives rise to trust by proposing a distinction or change in its nature, 
situating it in a relational, diachronic context. The development of relational approaches to trust 
has been, in Kramer’s view (1999), informed by research involving a variety of structures at a 
macro level, including networks and systems of governance, recording the emergence and 
dissemination of trust within and between organizations (e.g. Coleman, 1990, Kollock, 1994, 
Burt and Knez, 1995, Powell, 1996, in Kramer, 1999). 
1.1.5. Integrative approaches 
In view of the limitations of a measurement of trust based solely on behavioural manifestations 
of cooperation, as well as an approach focused solely on attenuating the risks of opportunism12, 
Sako (1992, 1998, Sako and Helper, 1998), puts forward a combined approach that anchors 
trust in economic, sociological and psychological theories, within the framework of 
                                                     
a relationship may be strong due to a high level of institutional trust. Mangematin (1998) sees them 
as coexisting and mutually reinforcing. 
12 Sako and Helper (1998) suggest that not placing trust in order to counter an agent’s opportunism 
ignores a number of situations. Considering only exposure to the risk of opportunism reduces the 
situation to a principal-agent relationship, in which (A) wants to have (B) perform a particular task. 
The asymmetry of information concerns both the skills and behaviour of agent (B). If the task is not 
performed correctly, the deficiency may be due to opportunistic behaviour on the part of agent (B), 
but also to his lack of competencies, or to random factors independent of the agent’s wishes and 
behaviour. 
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interorganizational relations13. Trust is defined as an expectation, a positive assessment of the 
predictability of the other party’s behaviour: “Trust is an expectation held by an agent that its 
trading partner will behave in a mutually acceptable manner (including an expectation that 
neither party will exploit the other’s vulnerabilities)” (Sako and Helper, 1998: 388, Sako, 2006: 
266). This expectation reduces the field of possibilities, thereby reducing uncertainty 
surrounding the partner’s actions (ibid.). In Sako’s approach (1992), trust is defined in terms of 
reciprocal norms agreed upon and developed in the dyadic relationship. She puts forward an 
evolving approach to trust by distinguishing, on one hand, and independently, competence 
trust14, which requires mutual agreement about the conduct of business, and on technical and 
managerial standards, and, on the other hand, trust based on a contract and trust based on 
goodwill. The last two are postulated in an additional relationship. Contractual trust15 is founded 
on a spirit of shared standards, ethics and promise-keeping16; goodwill trust17 is founded on 
commitment in the relationship, on initiatives taken in the common interest, without seeking an 
unfair advantage. It can only exist if there is consensus on the principles of equity and justice. 
Fulfilling a minimum number of obligations constitutes “contractual trust”, while fulfilling a large 
number constitutes goodwill trust, with a shift from the first form to the second requiring a gradual 
expansion in the congruence in beliefs about the definition of acceptable behaviours. Trust is 
not defined solely as the opposite of opportunism, but the absence of opportunistic behaviour is 
a prerequisite for contractual and goodwill trust (Sako and Helper, 1998). However, a lack of 
opportunism is not a sufficient condition for the emergence of goodwill trust: what is required is 
complying, beyond the letter, with the spirit of the contract. Complying with the spirit of the 
contract, demonstrating commitment and fair behaviour, comes close to the notion of goodwill 
trust (Sako, 2006: 269). Here, mutual expectations of reciprocal commitment in its most abstract 
form must be taken into account. Sako (1992) describes the partners’ will to take initiatives, or 
to use their room for manoeuvre to grasp new opportunities beyond what is explicitly agreed. 
This “partial gift exchange” (Akerlof, 1982, in Sako, 1991) is necessary to maintain goodwill 
trust18. Sako’s approach conceives of trust as complementing control (Sako, 1998, Sako and 
Helper, 1998). The predictability of behaviour is not based solely on constraints that would oblige 
the other party to follow a single possible path: trusting implies that the partner is free to take 
various alternatives during the course of the action. In the view of Sako and Helper (1998), trust, 
as a shared norm developed in the dyadic relationship, becomes an informal control mechanism 
that increases the effectiveness of transactions. 
                                                     
13 Particularly in the context of relationships between suppliers and buyers in the Japanese electronics 
industry. 
14 Is the other party capable of doing what it says it will do?  
15 Will the other party carry out its contractual agreements?  
16 Sako (1998) does not explicitly mention formal contractual obligations. The basis of this type of 
trust is the probity of the agent.  
17 Will the other party make an open-ended commitment to take initiatives for mutual benefit while 
refraining from unfair advantage taking? 
18 This type of trust is built up following frequent interactions and open sharing of technical and 
business information between partners. Increasingly in the hierarchy, a looser form of reciprocity takes 
root between the parties to the exchange. Reciprocity can take more varied forms and longer periods 
may elapse between the granting of an advantage and its reward (Gouldner, 1960, in Sako, 1998). 
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Rousseau et al. (1998)19 see trust as a “mixed-level concept”, combining cognitive, affective and 
conative processes, group dynamics at a micro level, and institutional influences at a macro 
level. They conceive of it as “bandwidth” that can vary in type, extent and intensity. Seeing trust 
as bandwidth and as a function of its extent makes it possible to reconcile various approaches 
to trust, whether calculative or not, or, by referring to different expectations in a complex 
relationship, to consider trust and distrust20 as independent constructs (e.g. Lewicki et al., 1998, 
Sitkin and Roth, 2006). 
1.2. Fuzzy but reasonable logic 
Bachmann (2001) finds that, overall, the dominant approach to trust combines an acceptance 
of the “fuzzy logic” of trust and the unshakable conviction that trust is ultimately “reasonable” 
(Hollis, 1998). Trust as such could therefore be described as a state resulting from a 
psychological process, somewhere between hypothetico-deductive reasoning and faith. Its 
arising is multidimensional in nature, in that trust is inherent in experience and interaction with a 
specific party to the exchange (e.g. Ring and Van De Ven, 1992) and that this interaction is 
socially situated. 
The fact remains however that, as a psychological state, trust lies with the person who grants it 
and for the trustor, trust is always extrapolated from available evidence (Luhmann, 1979). In 
other words, “whether our bases for trust are more calculative or more intuitive, more abstract 
or idiosyncratic, what matters in the end is that they represent ‘good reasons’ for trust” 
(Möllering, 2001: 413). Moreover, as we stated earlier, a certain amount of information about 
the actor in whom an individual could place his trust, the situation in which he will place it, and 
the risk involved, are required in order for trust to arise (Luhmann, 1988). 
In other words, on one hand, the need for trust arises in a specific, contextualized relationship 
where one actor has expectations of the actions of another (creating a dependence of the first 
actor on the second), and where the second is at least partly free to respond favourably or not 
(creating a risk for the first actor) and, on the other hand, the emergence of trust is based on a 
degree of knowledge and an assessment of the characteristics and behaviours of the other actor 
(his trustworthiness). 
  
                                                     
19 The approach of Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and Camerer is set out in greater detail below. 
20 Confident negative expectations regarding another’s conduct (Lewicki et al.,1998: 439). 
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2. Trust and trustworthiness 
2.1. Definition(s) 
Despite dating from nearly two decades ago, the definition formulated by Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt 
and Camerer (1998), together with the approach of Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995)21, 
remains frequently cited today, particularly for their integrated model and their distinction 
between trust and its antecedents22. In the literature on organizational trust, McEvily and 
Tortoriello (2011) identify 650 references to the definition by Rousseau et al. (1998), and 1300 
references to the model put forward by Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995). The definition by 
Mayer et al. (1995) – considered to be among the most robust by Lewicki et al. (2006) in a paper 
setting out the “state of the art” regarding research on trust and its developments – shows strong 
convergence as regards the essential elements of trust with definitions found in a wide review 
of dominant approaches (Bigley and Pearce, 1998, Rousseau et al., 1998): 1) positive or 
confident expectations regarding the other party, 2) a willingness to accept vulnerability in a 
relationship, 3) conditions of interdependence and risk (e.g. Zand, 1972, Hosmer, 1995, Mayer 
et al., 1995, Bigley and Pearce, 1998, Rousseau et al., 1998, Kramer, 1999, Lewicki et al., 2006). 
Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman’s definition of trust is: “the willingness to be vulnerable to the 
actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action 
important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control the other party” (1995: 
712). This definition applies to a relationship in which another identifiable party may act and 
react of his own volition towards the trustor. Vulnerability implies a potential for loss, since 
making oneself vulnerable means taking a risk. This is the “double contingency” defined by 
Luhmann: there is contingency because there is the possibility of freedom of choice for the 
trustor in response to the actions of the other party, which depend on the latter’s own freedom 
of choice; these freedoms of choice create indeterminacy (Luhmann, 2001). The authors point 
out that trust is not in itself the taking of a risk, but the “willingness to take risks” (Mayer et al., 
1995: 712). Moreover, they refer to Luhmann to distinguish between the notions “trust” and 
“confidence”, which are sometimes used without distinction or ambiguously in the literature (e.g. 
Coleman, 1990). With regard to trust, the authors maintain that a prior, initial risk23 must be 
recognized and assumed (Mayer et al., 1995). Confidence involves no determined willingness 
to choose to take a risk. A suitable measurement is “the extent to which a trustor is willing to 
voluntarily take risks at the hands of the trustee”, to surrender to the other party’s will and freely 
decided actions (Schoorman et al., 2007). In other words, in the authors’ model, the perceived 
level of risk moderates the relationship between trust and risk-taking, the level of trust being an 
indication of the extent of the risk that is desired to be taken. 
                                                     
21 Approach updated by Schoorman, Mayer and Davis (2007) 
22 Source: Publish and Perish 
23 At the end of this chapter we propose distinguishing the vulnerability inherent in the situation and 
the dependence in the relationship from the risk inherent in the act of trusting. The lexicology we 
choose differs slightly from the approach of Mayer et al. (1995), but seems to us to be in line with the 
double contingency put forward by Luhmann (1988). 
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In their 1998 article, “Not so different after all: a cross-discipline view of trust” Rousseau, Sitkin, 
Burt and Camerer put forward a definition that embodies the essence of the definitions found in 
scientific literature produced in most disciplines: “Trust is a psychological state comprising the 
intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour 
of another” (1998: 395) (the authors add: in conditions of risk and interdependence). Trust is not 
in itself a behaviour (such as cooperating) or choice (such as taking a risk), but an underlying 
psychological condition which can imply or result in such actions (ibid.). 
For Rousseau et al. (1998), risk and interdependence are inseparable from trust, but variations 
in these factors in the course of a relationship can affect both the level of trust and, potentially, 
its nature. For this reason, the authors return to the concept of trust as “bandwidth,” since its 
extent, nature and intensity can change depending on, or in the course of the relationship (see 
above). The authors’ objective is not to put forward a complete model for the development of 
trust, but to propose a framework and to understand the similarities across the various 
disciplines. Consistent with the notion of “bandwidth,” Rousseau et al. (1998) propose a range 
of trust running from a calculative basis, weighing up losses and gains, to an emotional response 
(Kramer, 1999). They posit a dependent relationship between calculus-based trust and 
relational-based trust in the course of a relationship, the second growing proportionally as the 
first wanes. Based not only on deterrence (Shapiro et al., 1992), but also on credible information 
about the characteristics and intentions of the other party, calculus-based trust gradually 
becomes relational through repeated interactions, and through the information obtained through 
the relationship itself; on top of this comes an emotional component (e.g. Coleman, 1990, 
McAllister, 1995, Lewicki et al., 2006, McAllister et al., 2006). Being able to count on the other 
party (reliability and dependability) brings forth positive expectations (Rousseau et al., 1998). In 
other words, trust, situated socially, derives from the experience and interaction with a particular 
party to the exchange. Trust both describes the relationship and is created by the relationship, 
which itself is engendered by reciprocal expectations (Mangematin, 1998). 
The authors add a third construct, an institutional trust that can facilitate and support the 
development of trust enabling risk-taking and trusting behaviour. The intensity of this form of 
trust is independent of calculative and relational trusts. Institutional support can exist at the 
societal level, in the form of social norms, social networks or legal provisions (e.g. Ring and Van 
De Ven, 1992, Gulati, 1995, Sitkin, 1995, in Rousseau et al., 1998). In the authors’ view, to the 
extent that trust reflects a positive attitude towards the other party’s motivation, it is essentially 
perceived as a substitute for control – which is not concerned with the parties’ motivational 
aspect. In this they differ from Shapiro et al. (1992), who see trust as a response to, a mechanism 
to counter, vulnerability (see above). The benefit of the institutional dimension, unlike in Zucker 
(1986), is that it supports the emergence of trust by providing shared knowledge and 
understanding (Rousseau et al., 1998) – in other words, shared reference points between the 
parties. On the other hand, they do not take a position on the effects of the exercising of control 
on the emergence and of element of trust. 
In summary, although a number of essential dimensions appear to be shared by the various 
approaches found, we observe differing demarcations, and even overlapping, of these 
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dimensions. Because of the recursive nature of trust, in particular, and in order to avoid 
terminological ambiguity or multiple meanings attached to identical labels, we propose the 
following conceptualizations and demarcations of the various elements that define and 
accompany trust: 
• Prior conditions creating the need for trust: 1) trust is defined in relation to expectations, 
which may be satisfied or disappointed. “A, the trustor, expects B, a second actor, to show 
such and such a behaviour expected by A.” If the trustor is always an individual, a physical 
person, the other party must above all have the possibility of acting. This actor, in whom the 
trust is placed, may be a person, but also a group or organization (e.g. Zaheer et al., 1998). 
Expectations describe the trustor’s dependence vis-à-vis the trustee. Associated with this 
dependence is the (first) contingency regarding the other party’s behaviour, which 
engenders vulnerability24. These expectations may change and may be generated by the 
dynamic of the relationship itself. 
• Input for trust: the “good reasons” on which the individual relies in order to trust, essentially 
the other party’s perceived trustworthiness (see below) in the light of the characteristics 
of the relationship and its context that affect the trustor’s vulnerability25 (including the 
potential for control).  
• Trust: trust is a psychological state (e.g. Rousseau et al., 1998). The “source” of the trust is 
highly subjective and essentially can only refer to the individual that places it (e.g. McEvily 
and Tortoriello, 2011): the trustor. Trust is signified by positive expectations (or negative 
expectations, signifying distrust) of the behaviours and intentions of the other party, the 
trustee, regarding the expectations that describe the dependence, taking into account the 
contingency in connection with the trustee’s behaviour. In other words, trust is accompanied 
by positive expectations regarding the use that the trustee will make of his discretionary part 
in the realization of the trustor’s expectations. 
• Output of trust: acceptance of vulnerability is shown by choice, the intention to take a risk26, 
the second contingency. The trustor may fall back on trust or control in the face of his 
vulnerability. In other words, he remains the master of the risk that he takes by relying on 
free choice and corresponding behaviour or on means of control in order to restrict the other 
party’s discretionary part in his behaviour. The risk exists post-trust; it arises because the 
individual decides to trust. The risk relates to the trustor’s attitude to vulnerability, which 
exists independently of trust. We would add that in this sense, the trustor’s dependence on 
the trustee becomes interdependence. Placing one’s trust creates new expectations that 
may be disappointed (e.g. Quéré, 2001), in that the vulnerability that is accepted (by placing 
trust, by relying on one’s own conjecture regarding the goodwill behaviour of the other party 
                                                     
24 Exposure to potential adverse consequences. 
25 And also each person’s propensity to trust, independent of the context (e.g. Rotter, 1967, Erikson, 
1968) 
26 The acceptance of vulnerability needs to be distinguished from the behavioural dimension of the 
acceptance of vulnerability, the taking of the risk: the fact of voluntarily exposing oneself (the voluntary 
dimension). This distinction comes back to the differentiation between trust and its effects. Risk exists 
when a decision in a situation involves stakes, the possibility for gain or loss. Risk-taking behaviour 
is based on a decision, following on from an acceptance of vulnerability (Mayer et al. 1995). 
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and the expectation of reciprocity, of a favourable response from the trustee) cannot be 
mastered by control. 
• Behavioural dimensions of trust: trust, or the absence of trust, is displayed to the other 
party by the first actor’s posture in the face of his own vulnerability to the second actor, that 
is, risk-taking behaviours. The trustor may either increase his reliance (Gillespie, 2003) on 
the trustee – thereby increasing the trustee’s “enablement” – or reduce it. 
2.2. Antecedents and the effects of trust  
For Seppännen et al. (2007), the question of causality is one of the main reasons for the 
ambiguity and confusion observed in the differentiation of the antecedents, dimensions or 
consequences of trust, and remains one of the biggest challenges (e.g. Rousseau et al., 1998, 
Seppänen et al., 2007). 
Within the psychological approach, Ferrin (2003) identified in the literature a “laundry list” of over 
50 causal elements that can be described as direct determinants of the level of trust in a 
relationship, or as covariants of the level of trust. Lewicki et al. (2006) categorized these 
elements as follows: 1) characteristic qualities of the trustor (e.g. propensity to trust), 2) 
characteristic qualities of the trustee (general trustworthiness, ability, benevolence, integrity, 
reputation, sincerity, etc.), 3) characteristics of the past relationship between the parties (e.g. 
patents of successful cooperation), 4) characteristics of the parties’ communication processes 
(e.g. threats, promises, openness of communication), 5) characteristics of the relationship 
between the parties (e.g. close friends, authority relationships, partners in a market transaction, 
etc.) and, lastly, 6) structural parameters that govern the relationship between the parties (e.g. 
availability of communication mechanisms, availability of third parties, etc.). 
Hardin (1992) conceptualizes trust as a three-part relationship involving 1) the properties of the 
trusting party, 2) the particularities of the context in which the trust is granted, and 3) the 
characteristics of the party in whom the trust is placed. If we return to the characterization made 
by Lewicki et al. (2006) of Ferrin’s (2003) list of causal elements that could be described as 
direct determinants of the level of trust in a relationship, or as covariants of the level of trust, we 
can also form three groups: 
1. Characteristics of the trustor (1): Some psychologists have defined the general disposition 
to trust as a personality trait (Rotter, 1967, Erikson, 1968). Mayer, Davis and Schoorman 
(1995) talk of propensity to trust, Kramer (1999) of dispositional trust27. Harrison McKnight 
et al. (1998) distinguish between two personal dispositions that influence the intention to trust 
differently: faith in humanity and a trusting stance. A “trusting stance” means that a person 
believes, independently of the other’s trustworthiness, that better results are obtained in 
relationships by acting as though the partner were trustworthy and well-intentioned. Since 
this is a conscious choice, a trusting stance falls into the calculus-based approach to trust 
                                                     
27 Das and Teng (2004) also add the propensity to take a risk. 
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(Riker, 1971, in McKnight et al., 1998). These personal tendencies, and not traits, are said 
to be “dispositional” because they reflect tendencies that manifest in different situations 
(McKnight et al., 1998). 
2. Characteristics of the type of relationship between the parties (5) and structural parameters 
governing the relationship between the parties (6): more broadly, we propose to associate 
these causal elements, or covariants, with the expectations and the vulnerability that 
characterize the relationship of dependence, in other words with the norms and mechanisms 
that affect the trustor’s disposition to take a risk, whether these refer to institutional trust (e.g. 
Rousseau et al., 1998) or explicitly to formal and informal control mechanisms (e.g. 
Schoorman et al., 2007). 
3. The characteristic qualities of the trustee (2), the characteristics of the past relationship 
between the parties (3) and the characteristics of the parties’ communication processes (4): 
we propose bringing these dimensions into a single group, because their role is ultimately to 
obtain information, to increase knowledge about characteristics and motivations, to observe 
the behaviours of the relationship partner, contributing to positive expectations associated 
with trust, to information leading to a gauging of the trustee’s trustworthiness. 
Trustworthiness allows a relationship of trust to be established that only survives if the finding 
of trustworthiness is validated during interactions (e.g. Pesqueux, 2009). Mayer et al. (1995) 
propose a “feedback loop” from behavioural manifestations of trust to dimensions of 
trustworthiness, a relationship that has been empirically tested by Serva, Fuller and Mayer 
(2005) and by Colquitt, Scott and LePine (2007), for example. 
2.2.1. Trustworthiness 
Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman’s integrated model clearly distinguishes between trust and its 
effects on one hand and trustworthiness on the other hand: “[…] characteristics and actions of 
the trustee will lead that person to be more or less trusted. These characteristics are important 
if researchers are to understand why some parties are more trusted than others. […]. Although 
they are not trust per se, these variables help build the foundation for the development of trust.” 
(Mayer et al., 1995: 717). 
Trust thus relates to the person who grants it, the trustor. It is distinct from the trustee’s 
trustworthiness (Mayer et al., 1995, Hardin, 2004). The notion of trustworthiness encompasses 
the dimensions of the trustee that favour the emergence of trust. 
Based on an identification of factors that influence trust, the authors propose three categories 
relating to the trustee’s characteristics that go a long way to explaining his perceived 
trustworthiness: “Each contributes a unique perceptual perspective from which to consider the 
trustee, while the set provides a solid and parsimonious foundation for the empirical study of 
trust for another party” (1995: 717). These characteristics are: ability28, meaning the trustee’s 
                                                     
28 Ability: that group of skills, competencies, and characteristics that enable a party to have influence 
within some specific domain (competence, perceived expertise) (Mayer et al., 1995: 717). 
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perceived competencies, integrity and probity, meaning the trustee’s perceived adherence to a 
certain number of values accepted by the trustor, together with benevolence29, in the sense of 
the trustee’s perceived willingness to act favourably towards the trustor, beyond selfish 
motivations. The types of trust developed by Sako and Helper (1998) in an interorganizational 
context follow a very similar logic: 1) competence trust, referring to the trustee’s perceived 
competence, including expected technical or managerial standards, 2) contractual trust, 
referring to the agent’s probity, the fulfilment of the contract, and associated values, and 3) 
goodwill trust, referring to the trustee’s perceived benevolence, the consideration of shared 
interests in the relationship, without taking unfair advantage. In other words, the first two 
dimensions focus mainly on the trustee’s expected and perceived characteristics regarding his 
abilities, responsibility and associated values, while the last dimension refers to the trustee’s 
expected and perceived posture in the face of the protagonists’ interests (his own, those of the 
trustor, and their shared interests).30 
While the model put forward by Mayer et al. (1995, Mayer and Davis, 1999) posits that the 
trustee’s perceived trustworthiness leads the trustor to make decisions concerning his 
vulnerability, these decisions manifesting through a variety of trusting behaviours, McEvily and 
Torentiello (2011) point out that few studies have truly empirically validated this causal chain in 
its entirety. They add that, at the same time, other studies postulate that the willingness to make 
oneself vulnerable does not necessarily connect the effects of perceptions of trustworthiness 
and positive expectations with behaviours (Colquitt et al., 2007). Colquitt et al. (2007) observe 
that although the trustor’s positive expectations regarding the trustee’s behaviours and 
intentions and the trustee’s perceived trustworthiness are conceptually distinct, in their 
operationalization they nevertheless overlap and are consequently frequently considered to be 
of equivalent extent. 
2.2.2. Trusting behaviour and reciprocity  
As we have shown, trust develops over the course of interactions between the partners (e.g. 
Anderson and Narus, 1990, Gulati, 1995, Ring and Ven, 1994, Sako and Helper, 1998, Dyer 
and Chu, 2003, Poppo et al., 2008), with the partners discovering over time whether the other 
                                                     
29 Benevolence: the extent to which the trustee is believed to want to do good to the trustor, aside 
from an egocentric profit motive (loyalty, openness, caring, receptivity, availability) (Mayer et al., 1995: 
718). 
30 Note that some authors consider goodwill – in that it refers to the partners' motivations and interests 
that require them to invest in the relationship (e.g. Sako and Helper, 1998) – as the affective 
component of trust (e.g. Ganesan, 1994, Doney and Cannon, 1997, Kumar et al., 1995). Nevertheless, 
we consider that a cognitive component of goodwill inevitably comes into play in the trustee's 
dimension of perceived trustworthiness. This in no way precludes the involvement of affective 
elements in the "leap of faith" of trust at the individual level, nor the fact that these elements that 
generate an affective dimension can be supported by characteristics that approach perceived goodwill 
or benevolence; but it seems to us that a blurring of dimensions relating to the trustee's behaviour 
(regarding expectations that characterize the trustor's dependency and vulnerability) with trust arising 
out of the relationship itself, comprising a dimension that can be described as affective, leads to a 
degree of confusion observed in the differentiation between the antecedents, components and 
dimensions of trust and its consequences. 
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party is trustworthy (e.g. Anderson and Narus, 1990, Shapiro et al., 1992, Lewicki and Bunker, 
1995). The relationship develops as a result of the frequency of interactions and the diversity of 
situations encountered (e.g. Lewicki et al., 1998). 1) First, the relationship provides information 
about the respective characteristics of the partners (e.g. Deutsch, 1958, Lindskold, 1978), and 
2) second, over time, the partners identify with each other, leading to a process of internalization 
and appropriation of the other party’s preferences (e.g. Shapiro et al., 1992, Lewicki and Bunker, 
1995, Poppo et al., 2008). Trust increases, or can decrease, as a result of the interactions 
experienced between the parties and the context in which they take place. If expectations 
regarding behaviour are met, trust increases, but if expectations are dashed, it decreases (e.g. 
March and Olsen, 1975, Shapiro et al., 1992, Lewicki and Bunker, 1996, Kramer, 1999, Bijlsma-
Frankema and Costa, 2005). 
In transformational approaches to trust (e.g. Shapiro et al., 1992, Lewicki and Bunker, 1995, 
Rousseau et al., 1998), relational trust (Lewicki and Bunker, 1995, Rousseau et al., 1998), or 
resilient trust in Ring (1996), is the result of a process in which trust is founded, initially, on 
discovery of the partner’s characteristics, tying in with Ganesan’s (1994) notion of credibility, 
which designates both the competence and the seriousness of the partner, and then becomes 
endogenous to the experience of the relationship. In the same vein, the stability of the 
relationship and the development of shared visions and standards reinforces Zucker’s (1986) 
process-based trust, but gift/counter-gift exchanges (ibid.), or the reciprocity experiences of 
Creed and Miles (1996) are also involved. Built over time, trust is one of the rare resources 
whose value increases with use (Dasgupta and Gambetta, 1998). This suggests that, at least in 
part, trust is a reciprocal concept that can potentially be both cause and effect (e.g. Blomqvist, 
2002). 
The reciprocity of trust involves its co-constructed dimension. It is a necessary condition for the 
strengthening of trust in a virtuous circle of the “I trust because you trust” (McAllister, 1995) or 
“trust begets trust” (Creed and Miles, 1996) type. Placing trust is rewarded by trust: being 
distrustful generates distrust (Schoorman et al., 2007). The trustor’s voluntary exposure to risk 
– in that he decides to rely on the trustee’s free choice and corresponding behaviour instead of 
means of control to restrict them – creates the expectation of a favourable response from the 
trustee, an example of the co-constructed dimension of trust. In other words, in a given 
relationship, conceptually, “sufficiently strong” trust can only be reciprocal (e.g. Lewicki and 
Bunker, 1995).  
Trust then fits into a pattern of interdependence, reducing opportunistic behaviour and defining 
the dynamics of the relationship. From that moment, trust is no longer purely cognitive: Louis 
Quéré (2001) considers that it becomes itself a moral standard in the relationship31. 
                                                     
31 A’s voluntary subordination creates a constraint for B because of a social norm (with associated 
sanctions) that requires trust to be honoured: on one hand B feels obliged to provide continuity of 
conduct or a general mode of behaviour that aroused A’s trust, and on the other hand, knowing that 
A has trusted him, he feels obliged to honour this trust: A can thus count on the moral sense of 
obligation that B will feel to gauge the probability of the conduct he expects of him (Quéré, 2001:131). 
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In the view of Gillespie (2003), when trust is restricted to its voluntary dimension (the acceptance 
of vulnerability) and its behavioural dimension (the corresponding risk-taking), the trustor can 
display trust in two main ways: by 1) reliance, or by 2) disclosure. Gillespie’s (2003) proposition, 
based on a review of the literature, is in keeping with the definition of Rousseau et al. (1998), in 
the context of interpersonal relations at work of the “hierarchical supervisor-subordinates” type. 
The first dimension involves a category of trusting behaviour by means of which a person relies 
“on another’s skills, knowledge, judgments or actions, including delegating and giving autonomy” 
(Gillespie, 2003: 10). “Disclosure” is part of a second category of trusting behaviour, involving 
“sharing work-related or personal information of a sensitive nature” (ibid.: 10). A high level of 
trust would thus be manifested, in particular, by substantial delegation, a decision not to engage 
in monitoring, and open sharing of information. Conversely, distrust would be manifested by 
increased monitoring, interventions and checks, and the withholding of information (e.g. Colquitt 
et al., 2007). 
More broadly, communication between partners is a fundamental question in the study of trust. 
Since the relationship of dependence arises because of asymmetrical knowledge between the 
partners, leading to vulnerability, the process of information between the partners during the 
relationship contributes to an acceptance of this vulnerability. When not based on the 
relationship, the interactions and concrete exchanges of partners, reputation – “second-hand 
knowledge” (Burt and Knez, 1995, Harrison McKnight et al., 1998) – is the most significant 
variable facilitating the emergence of trust between two partners who have never previously 
interacted (e.g. Akrout and Akrout, 2011). Regarding the relational aspect, the dimensions 
associated with communication are the most important determinants in the emergence of trust 
with regard to: the quality of the formal exchange of information (Anderson and Narus, 1990), 
the celerity of information exchange (Moorman et al., 1992), and the frequency and quality of 
communication (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). Where there are shared values, communication is 
predominant in the quality of relationships (Joshi, 2009). Communication can then be considered 
as an antecedent or as a consequence of trust (e.g. Akrout and Akrout, 2011). Open 
communication can thus become just as much an expectation directed towards the 
characteristics or values expected of the trustee as an operational norm in the relationship. In 
the inventory of Mayer et al. (1995), openness appears not only among the principles associated 
with integrity (Butler, 1991), but also in the consideration of the trustor’s interests, that is, 
benevolence (Mishra, 1996).  
McEvily and Torentiello (2011) emphasize that Gillespie’s (2003) proposal, concentrating as it 
does solely on the voluntary dimension of trust, neglects the positive expectations highlighted in 
the definition of Rousseau et al. (1998). In complementary fashion, Mayer et al. (1995), like 
Gillespie (2003), justify the notion of reciprocity by the fact that trust is manifested by the 
intention to take a risk in a situation of uncertainty, but also because integrity implies agreement 
regarding shared values of behaviour in the relationship and benevolence, a consideration of 
shared interests in the relationship the prerequisite for which is a lack of opportunistic behaviour. 
Empirically, this relationship was established by Serva, Fuller and Mayer (2005) in the 
development of trust between interdependent teams. In the context of hierarchical 
supervisor/subordinate relationships, Brower, Schoorman, and Tan (2000), utilizing an 
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extension of the model of Mayer et al. (1995), show that trust is not necessarily mutual and 
reciprocal. In other words, A may trust B, while B does not trust A. One of the limitations raised 
by the authors of the model is that the conceptualization is unidimensional and does not explore 
reciprocity in trust relationships (Mayer et al., 1995, Schoorman et al., 2007). Note that the 
integrated model of trust of Mayer et al. (1995) proposes a feedback loop in order to model 
changes in trust over time, proceeding from trusting behaviour towards factors of trustworthiness 
and not trust directly. 
Moreover, in the framework of the relationships between an agency and its parent ministry, we 
have observed that the trust of a member of the agency towards the ministry, and his perception 
of reciprocal trust, that is, trust placed in the agency by members of the ministry, is always 
evaluated as equivalent. In other words, if the respondent’s trust in the other party is strong, his 
perception will be that trust in his own organization will also be strong, and conversely, if his 
trust is lukewarm, he will also perceive trust in his own organization similarly. In addition, 
perception of the trust felt by the partner remains fairly idiosyncratic and is based on a variety of 
clues depending on the individual. Some focus on the attitude of partners and exchanges, or the 
content or form of communication. Others choose a more comprehensive point of view, placing 
value on the tangible results of coordination, the level of autonomy allowed, and support for 
organizational development as a whole, taking precedence over sometimes strained exchanges. 
The gauging of trust therefore appears to be somewhat volatile and, in some cases, subject to 
the influence of the immediate or recent history of exchanges with the partner. And yet, when 
the viewpoint is inverted, the level of trust felt by the members of the ministry does not necessary 
match the level perceived by members of the agency and, although a particular behaviour of the 
ministry may be perceived as a sign of distrust towards the agency, it does not necessarily 
signify the ministry’s established distrust in the agency (Fivat, 2013). 
2.2.3. Predictability 
Although there is a clear connection between predictability and trust, with both playing a part in 
reducing uncertainty (Lewis and Weigert, 1985a), if we are to make sense of trust, it cannot be 
limited to predictability (Deutsch, 1958). 
Predictability does refer to expectations of the other party’s behaviour, but does not include the 
notion of vulnerability (Mayer et al., 1995). Indeed, an increase in predictability is considered as 
an output of trust (e.g. Ring and Van De Ven, 1992)32. But it cannot be total, otherwise a reliance 
on trust would be meaningless (e.g. Luhmann, 1979, Bradach and Eccles, 1989, Mayer et al., 
1995, Sako and Helper, 1998), since the existence of a contingency is required in order for the 
agent’s trustworthiness to manifest (e.g. Bradach and Eccles, 1989, Mayer et al., 1995, Sako 
and Helper, 1998). 
                                                     
32 Confidence or predictability in one’s expectations about another’s behavior, and confidence in 
another’s goodwill (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992). 
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Nevertheless, predictability – the result of the consistency of the trustee’s behaviour – remains 
an essential dimension of trust (Shapiro et al., 1992, Zaheer et al., 1998). As an input of trust, 
consistency (Butler, 1991) appears as a dimension of perceived trustworthiness, in relation to 
the trustee’s integrity in the list drawn up by Mayer et al. (1995). In other words, the partner’s 
hitherto perceived consistency will contribute to establishing a prediction that it will continue. 
However, the trustee’s predictability may also be due to external factors such as control 
mechanisms (ibid.). In addition, the “deeper” dimensions of trust – Sako and Helper’s (1998) 
goodwill trust or Lewicki and Bunker’s (1995) identification-based trust – consider that the 
partner will not take unfair advantage, but will serve shared interests, even in new situations in 
which one cannot rely on the partner’s previous behaviour. 
In relations between an agency and its parent ministry, we have observed that the consistency 
of the ministry’s expectations and behaviours regarding the agency is a foundation of its 
perceived trustworthiness, on which the trust of members of the agency toward the ministry is 
founded (Fivat, 2013). The political environment of these relations makes this subject particularly 
sensitive, as the deleterious effects of a ministry’s “ex-post haggling” on the trust of agencies 
has been raised by Binderkrantz and Christensen (2009). Nevertheless, we have also observed 
that, since a lack of consistency may also be due to third-party influences on the ministry, the 
primary factor in the building of trust in the ministry remains its intention and its use of 
discretionary decisional powers (Fivat, 2013). 
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3. Operationalization 
Trust is all about one party’s expectations of the other. It is defined as a psychological state 
marked by an intention to accept vulnerability and positive expectations regarding the other 
party’s intentions and behaviour (adapted from Rousseau et al., 1998: 395). Trust essentially 
resides in a person (Luhmann, 1979) who, in the given context, bases his interpretation of the 
situation, of evidence, or at least of available indicators, on what he considers to be “good 
reasons” for placing his trust (Möllering, 2001)33. 
The trustee’s dispositions that are likely to arouse trust constitute his perceived trustworthiness 
(e.g. Mayer et al., 1995). Consequently, the trustee’s trustworthiness must be demonstrated. In 
other words, the trustee must have the ability to act, to demonstrate these dispositions that are 
likely to arouse trust, in order to respond favourably to the trustor’s expectations. The trustor’s 
dependence on the trustee’s behaviour creates his vulnerability. The trustor’s assessment of 
trustworthiness, based on a positive assessment of these various expectations, will contribute 
to the emergence of trust, or will at least provide the trustor with elements that he can use in 
interpreting the “good reasons” for placing his trust, if he believes that the positive assessment 
of these expectations will persist into the future, thereby becoming positive expectations, in this 
sense predictive, through the action of trust (Rousseau et al., 1998, Möllering, 2001). 
The model of Mayer et al. (1995, Mayer and Davis, 1999) postulates that the trustee’s perceived 
trustworthiness leads the trustor to make decisions regarding his vulnerability and hence the 
trust he is willing to grant – a trust that will only persist if the finding of trustworthiness is verified 
during interactions (e.g. Pesqueux, 2009). In other words, the trustor’s positive expectations 
must be confirmed in interactions to come, thus confirming the trustee’s trustworthiness. 
This circular nature of the process poses a major difficulty for measuring trust and, in their 
operationalization, the trustor’s positive expectations regarding the trustee’s behaviour and 
intentions come close to the latter’s perceived trustworthiness. Trust and perceived 
trustworthiness are therefore frequently dealt with identically as regards their measurement (e.g. 
Colquitt et al., 2007).  
And yet, although the connection between trust and trustworthiness has been demonstrated 
many times, viewing perceived trustworthiness and trust as equivalent reduces the 
measurement of trust to the partner’s knowledge (Möllering, 2013), moving away from the 
essential nature of trust which is “both less and more than knowledge” (Simmel, 1990: 179), 
although it “stands outside the categories of knowledge and ignorance” (Simmel, 1990, in 
Möllering, 2001). 
                                                     
33 Interpretations, however, will not translate directly into expectations (Möllering, 2001). The mental 
leap of trust and the perception and assessment of the risk are a highly subjective matter (ibid.). 
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Conceptually, Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995) distinguish between trust and factors of 
perceived trustworthiness. These factors are grouped into three generic categories: ability, 
benevolence and integrity. 
Since trust is considered with regard to its effects on an interorganizational relationship, as we 
have presented earlier, the dimensions proposed by Sako and Helper (1998) – competence 
trust34, contractual trust35, goodwill trust36 – are close to the generic categories of 
trustworthiness proposed by Mayer et al. (1995). Nevertheless, the wording of the definitions 
concern expectations of the partner’s behaviour, and in her approach, Sako considers them as 
three different types of trust. In the same vein, Zaheer et al. (1998) define trust in its predictive 
dimension, with no absolute certainty, and in its cognitive, affective and conative components, 
in three dimensions37, namely reliability38, predictability39 and fairness40, also calling on positive 
expectations of the partner’s intentions and behaviour41. On the other hand, in the context of 
interfirm alliances, Das and Teng (1998) put forward techniques that an organization can 
implement in order to facilitate the construction of trust: respect for fairness, communication, or 
interfirm adaptation, which shows the will to act for shared interests, rather than serving one’s 
own interests42. Because the definition of trust does not explicitly include an expectational 
dimension43, it could also refer to the trustee’s perceived trustworthiness: “trust is the degree to 
which the trustor holds a positive attitude toward the trustee's goodwill and reliability in a risky 
exchange situation” (1998: 494). 
This is why, in our operationalization (Fivat, 2013), we propose to demarcate and clearly 
distinguish trust as such, in its cognitive, affective and conative components, from the tangible 
or observable bases, for the trustor, on which trust relies or is founded. These involve the 
dispositions of the object of trust that are likely to arouse an individual’s trust, since the individual 
is the source of trust. Whether these bases are founded on the trustee’s qualities or on 
characteristics of the past relationship and communication, they involve perception and 
assessment of the characteristics, motivation, intentions and behaviour of the partner in the 
relationship. 
  
                                                     
34 Is the other party capable of doing what it says it will do? 
35 Will the other party carry out its contractual agreements? 
36 Will the other party make an open-ended commitment to takes initiatives for mutual benefit while 
refraining from unfair advantage taking? 
37 Whether the object of trust is an individual or an organization  
38 The expectation that an actor can be relied on to fulfill obligations (Anderson and Weitz, 1989). 
39 The expectation that an actor will behave in a predictable manner 
40 The expectation that an actor will act and negotiate fairly when the possibility for opportunism is 
present (Anderson and Narus, 1990, Bromiley and Cummings,1995). 
41 Note that in 2006, in their article Does trust still matter (Mc Evily et Zaheer, 2006), these various 
expectations are grouped into different dimensions: competence, goodwill and credibility. 
42 Trust is earned from partners if one adapts to the needs of cooperation in partnerships. 
43 In their approach, the predictive dimension is associated with confidence. 
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The generic categories proposed are as follows (adapted from Mayer et al., 1995, Sako and 
Helper, 1998): 
a) Trustworthiness based on competencies relates to resources of the trustee that are 
mobilizable (abilities, capacities, knowledge, know-how) and mobilized (results that can 
benefit the trustor). 
b) Trustworthiness based on probity relates to the trustee’s fulfilment of his commitments and 
duties, and to standards and values that are associated or expected by the trustor.  
c) Trustworthiness based on goodwill relates to the trustee’s favourable disposition towards the 
trustor and his interests, without any motive to take advantage of them selfishly.  
In other words, the first two dimensions relate mainly to expected and perceived characteristics 
of the trustee regarding his abilities, responsibilities and associated values, while the last relates 
to the trustee’s expected and perceived posture regarding the interests of the protagonists (his 
own, those of the trustor, and their shared interests) (Fivat, 2013). 
Moreover, although trust involves two key elements – the trustor’s posture towards his own 
vulnerability and expectations of favourable treatment from the trustee (e.g. Colquitt et al., 2007) 
– it exists above all in a singular relationship, vulnerability being built into variable expectations 
that qualify this particular relationship (e.g. McEvily and Tortoriello, 2011). Perceived 
trustworthiness remains relative to the responses made to each party’s reciprocal expectations, 
whether these expectations are the source of the dependence and associated vulnerability, or 
whether they are generated by the relationship itself, by the experience of exchanges. 
In other words, if assessing the partner’s trustworthiness involves the question “Why should I 
trust?”, defining the expectations of the parties in the relationship answers the question “What 
am I trusting for?” 
These expectations are not necessarily the same for both partners. From a relational 
perspective, they are partly built on shared behavioural expectations, but they are also 
dependent on the nature of the real and symbolic “contract” and both parties’ respective 
contributions to it. In a business relationship, the buyer’s perception of the supplier’s 
trustworthiness is different from the supplier’s perception of the buyer’s trustworthiness 
(Ganesan, 1994). As Ganesan shows, the buyer (the principal) relies mainly on the supplier’s 
reputation or credibility (the abilities and seriousness of the partner) to assess his 
trustworthiness, whereas the supplier (the agent) relies more on internal parameters such as 
satisfaction with past experiences. 
This does not prevent the other generic categories of trustworthiness (Mayer et al., 1995) from 
being relevant for both parties in the relationship. However, on one hand, the relative importance 
of the various categories could differ (e.g. Ganesan, 1994) and, on the other hand, in their 
operationalization, concretely, the indicators that allow them to be assessed are based on 
different elements, by reason of the corresponding qualifying roles and expectations in a given 
relationship. Nevertheless, each of these indicators will contribute to the trustee’s perceived 
general trustworthiness. 
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In the view of Akrout and Akrout, because the perceptions of each party may diverge, “it is 
necessary to develop a dyadic approach to trust that allows opinions to be compared” (2011: 
11). In other words, although a reciprocal dimension appears in the construction of trust, the 
interpretation of which results from favourable (or unfavourable) expectations (Möllering, 2001) 
ultimately lies with each trustor. The good reasons also depend on the context and the nature 
of the relationship. 
In its operationalization, our proposal therefore comprises three distinct dimensions (Fivat, 
2013): 
a) The trustor’s concrete expectations of the trustee. 
b) The trustee’s trustworthiness as perceived by the trustor, trustworthiness being gauged by 
the trustee’s responses to the trustor’s expectations. Trustworthiness may relate to the 
perceived competencies, probity and goodwill of the trustee. 
c) Trust, manifested by positive expectations regarding the qualities, behaviour or intentions 
of the trustee. Trust can itself create new expectations in the relationship. 
Figure 2: Expectations, perceived trustworthiness and trust 
  
 
 
In a dyadic assessment of trust, trust between the parties, the perspective must also be inverted 
for all three dimensions, with the trustee becoming the trustor, and vice versa. 
In the light of the results of our 2013 study, distinct operationalizations and measurements of 
trust and trustworthiness based on the expectations of the specific relationship studied appear 
to open useful avenues. In its multidimensional operationalization, trustworthiness appears to 
offer a degree of “tolerance”, provided that it is judged to be “sufficiently” high overall, so that 
trust can arise. In other words, even if the responses made by the partner are not necessarily 
optimal for all expectations, a sufficient overall “threshold” of trustworthiness would enable trust 
to arise. 
Lastly, if trustworthiness is necessary for trust to occur, it cannot replace it. The study of trust, 
as a complement, gives meaning to trustworthiness. It lends it a prescriptive dimension, 
expectations being transformed into positive expectations, with the usefulness and benefits of 
the concept residing, in an organizational context, in the confidence provided by these positive 
expectations.  
perceived 
trustworthiness trust expectations 
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4. The object of trust  
Although trust, as a psychological state, remains intrinsically a phenomenon at the individual 
level, the object of trust may be an individual, a group, an organization or an institution. In view 
of the embeddedness and the interactions between the objects of these different levels of 
analysis, the corresponding types of trust are not independent. 
From a societal perspective, institutional trust is based on formal societal structures 
guaranteeing the attributes of an individual or an organization (norms, code of ethics, contracts, 
laws) (e.g. Zucker, 1986). For Rousseau et al. (1998), institutional trust facilitates, or supports, 
the growth of trust between the parties, enabling risk-taking and trusting behaviour. For Giddens 
(1990), it is associated with “reliability and faith in the correctness of abstract principles” 
(Giddens, 1990: 34). In other words, institutional trust is “extra-relational”: it involves 
“guarantees” that the environment provides in a specific relationship between two actors.  
Considering an institution as an actor, Carnevale (1995) likens institutional trust to a conviction 
or faith that the institution will be fair, reliable, competent and nonthreatening. Barber includes 
its members in the concept: “As individuals deal with each other, with organizations, and with 
institutions, and when organizations and institutions deal with each other, they count on both 
technically competent performance and on direct moral responsibility for their welfare” (1983: 
165). The trustor envisages that not only will an organization or institution (understood as 
systems that are organized and oriented towards a purpose) take action that will be beneficial 
to him, but also that most of the agents making up the institution will act fairly, competently and 
reliably (Barney and Hansen, 1994). Whitley (1987) conceives of organizational trust hinging on 
the collective characteristics of an administrative organization and its top management group, 
which are not reducible to features of individual actors and which insure some continuity of 
activities and direction when those actors change. Trust in an organization, then, appears to be 
equivalent to a judgment of its overall trustworthiness, the characteristics of an organization and 
of its members considered as a whole, and positive expectations as to its future actions. More 
recently, Maguire and Phillips have defined trust in an institution as an expectation: “An 
individual’s expectation that some organized system will act with predictability and goodwill” 
(2008: 372). 
On the other hand, inter-organizational trust involves one organization trusting another. The 
trusted organization then becomes also a source of trust. Hosmer (1995) found that inter-
organizational trust as a form of governance is poorly defined because of its intangibility and its 
informal nature: the difficulties of defining the absence or the presence of trust in a constant, 
convincing manner has created numerous misunderstandings within and between the various 
disciplines. Empirical studies all appear to share the same difficulty to a greater or lesser extent, 
as raised by Seppänen et al. (2007) and Currall and Inkpen (2002): “misspecification of the firm 
as the level of theory and the person as the level of measurement is common in alliance 
research” (Currall and Inkpen, 2002: 481). Medlin and Quester (2002) described it as an “inter-
level generalization problem”. Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone (1998) pointed out that this 
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ambiguity is particularly apparent in the literature dealing with transaction costs. This involves 
firms behaving in an opportunistic matter, attributing in doing so individual motivations and 
behaviours (micro level) to organizations (macro level), implying, for Zaheer et al., a “cross-level 
fallacy” (Rousseau, 1985): “We maintain that theories of interfirm exchange that simply view 
opportunism – or conversely, trust – as a property of organizations without specifying the link 
between micro and macro levels is inaccurate as it tends to anthropomorphize the organization” 
(Zaheer et al., 1998: 142). 
The major difficulty in conceiving the role of trust as a facilitator of coordination between two 
organizations is to move from a phenomenon that exists at the individual level to an 
organizational level of analysis: “Not clearly specifying how trust translates from the individual 
to the organization level leads to theoretical confusion about who is trusting whom, because it 
is individuals as members of organizations, rather than the organizations themselves, who trust” 
(Zaheer et al., 1998: 141). Whereas individuals may share a common attitude towards an 
organization, trust remains fundamentally inherent in individuals: “interorganizational trust 
describes the extent to which organizational members have a collectively-held trust orientation 
toward the partner firm, which is quite different from saying that organizations trust each other” 
(Zaheer et al., 1998: 143). Similarly, Nooteboom et al. (1997) acknowledge the key role of the 
individuals and consider that their propensity to trust is influenced by the organizational 
environment (and their perception of the risk). They address trust as an individual’s perception 
of a partner organization, and their variables relating to trust are linked to the perception of 
mutual relations. 
In a “buyer-supplier” business relationship, Zaheer et al. (1998) show that interorganizational 
trust and interpersonal trust are distinct but related constructs playing different roles in the 
performance of interfirm exchange44. In their 1998 reference study, Zaheer, McEvily and 
Perrone consider the importance of interpersonal trust between “individual boundary spanners,” 
that is, between physical persons performing exchanges on behalf of their respective 
organization, in connection with the construction of interorganizational trust. The authors 
postulate that these two types of trust influence each other mutually and that considering only 
one type of trust is insufficient to explain the performance of interorganizational exchanges. 
On one hand, relational trust is built up through the experience of interactions with a specific 
partner (Ring and Van De Ven, 1992). In addition, Zaheer et al. (1998) point out that 
organizations are far from being monolithic, but rather “pluralistic, divided into interests, sub-
units, and subcultures” (Pfeffer, 1982: 64). Relationships with external actors are managed by 
individuals (Friedman and Podolny, 1992), “individual boundary spanners” (Katz and Kahn, 
1978), whose orientations and motivations are not necessarily uniform with those of the 
organization as a whole: “Hence, when examining the characteristics of an interorganizational 
                                                     
44 Operationalization is based on the following reasoning: the less cooperative the supplier is in 
meeting the buyers' needs, the higher the transaction costs the buyer incurs in trying to achieve its 
goals in the supply relationship (Walker, 1994: 583). 
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relationship, we need to study the individual and organizational levels simultaneously” (Zaheer 
et al., 1998: 143). 
On the other hand, the connection between interpersonal and interorganizational trust is 
maintained by organizational processes and dynamics (Zaheer et al., 1998). Over time, through 
repeated exchanges and interactions, the connections between the two organizations develop 
into more stable, more profound cooperative arrangements (Gulati, 1995). Although the 
“boundary spanners” may change, the definition and distribution of roles persists (Ring and Ven, 
1994). Informal undertakings made between boundary spanners become institutionalized over 
time, and organizational routines are taken for granted (Zucker, 1977). A new boundary spanner 
is then socialized into the current norms during exchanges (Macneil, 1980). Norms of 
interorganizational relations are internalized and re-created in the conduct of business and 
personal interactions, thus leading to interpersonal trust. At the same time, interpersonal trust 
becomes re-institutionalized, with the trust of boundary spanners influencing the trust of other 
members of the partner organization (Zaheer et al., 1998). 
Examining trust in its dimension of predictability, without absolute certainty, together with its 
cognitive, affective and conative components (e.g. Lewis and Weigert, 1985b,  
Rempel et al., 1985), Zaheer et al. (1998) show empirically that interpersonal45 and 
interorganizational trust are distinct but reinforce each other. Although interpersonal trust alone 
has effects on the costs of negotiation and the level of conflict in the dyad, interorganizational 
trust has a direct effect on the performance of interorganizational exchanges. Moreover, 
considering interpersonal trust solely as a proxy of interorganizational trust ignores institutional 
insertion and its effects. Personal interactions take place in and are influenced by a social 
context (Coleman, 1990) and by organizational rules (Sitkin and Roth, 1993). These rules are 
constraining [editor’s note: somewhat] and guide the actions of members of the organization, 
depending additionally on the institutional context of the coordination (Zaheer et al., 1998). 
  
                                                     
45 In particular, the items related to predictability do not emerge from interorganizational trust, whereas 
the items related to reliability do not appear in interpersonal trust.  
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II. Trust and the public sector 
In the public sector field, the study of trust has traditionally focused on citizens’ trust in the 
administration, political authorities or, more generally, the public sector as a whole (e.g. Hardin, 
1992, Hardin, 1998, Van de Walle and Bouckaert, 2003, Hardin, 2004, Carter and Bélanger, 
2005, Van de Walle et al., 2008, Hardin, 2013). 
Be that as it may, there is growing interest in the study of trust within the public sector, mainly in 
relationships between politico-administrative authorities and organizations mandated to carry 
out public tasks, specifically public agencies (Rommel and Christiaens, 2009, van Thiel and van 
der Wal, 2010, van Thiel and Yesilkagit, 2011, Rommel, 2012, Fivat, 2013). This interest is due 
not only to the new organizational forms that have emerged in the past 20 years and 
corresponding new forms of relationship between an authority and its operational entities, but 
also to the observed limitations of the mechanisms for coordination between these various 
actors (e.g. Bouckaert, 2012). 
The reforms associated with New Public Management (NPM), aimed at improving public sector 
performance, have proposed models of governance based on a contractual relationship 
between the government and, an organization in charge of a public task, associated with a 
(partial) lifting of bureaucratic rules and procedures applying to the organization. These models 
of governance, derived from economic theories and models intrinsically based on suspicion 
between actors (e.g. Bouckaert, 2012), grant a predominant role to various control, audit or 
incentive mechanisms. In practice, their application has led to excessive controls running 
counter to the flexibility that the model is intended to achieve, and to implementation difficulties, 
particularly performance incentives and a heightening of the risks of conflict because of 
potentially contradictory expectations among the various actors (ministers, senior civil servants, 
agency managers, etc.) (e.g. ‘t Hart and Wille, 2006).  
In other words, the usefulness of a study of trust within the public service essentially involves 
bilateral, inter partes trust, as support for coordination between various actors and entities. For 
the purposes of the model of governance, trust is seen as a substituting for, or at least 
complementing, control. The confidence provided by trust may make it possible to reduce the 
intensity of control (e.g. Smitka, 1994, Mayer et al., 1995, Dekker, 2004), or at least increase 
the effectiveness of coordination (e.g. Sitkin, 1995, Nooteboom et al., 1997, Das and Teng, 
1998, Poppo and Zenger, 2002, Inkpen and Currall, 2004). At the relational level, trust is 
associated with cooperative behaviours (e.g. Pesqueux, 2009). 
However, the interest in citizens’ trust in public institutions involves primarily societal and 
demographic issues and the relationship of trust remains unilateral. That being so, if the various 
relationships that can be studied from the angle of trust are multiple (citizens’ trust in 
government, parliament, the administration as a whole, a department or agency in particular, 
etc.; and within the public service, among its various actors: parliament, government, central 
services, agencies, etc.) (e.g. Bouckaert, 2012), the differing relational issues and types justify 
distinguishing two types of relationship in the conceptual approach to trust: 
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1. Within the State or the public sector, between its various authorities, entities and actors. 
2. Of the citizen, or other external actor, in the State or the various public-sector authorities, 
entities or actors. 
1. Trust within the public sector  
Coordination of the various entities within the public sector and their agents involves long-lasting 
relationships and repeated interactions having a specific purpose. Trust therefore occurs in the 
corresponding dynamics – interpersonal and, by analogy, interorganizational. 
In the bureaucratic conception of public administration, the law, rules and hierarchy are designed 
to direct the actions of its entities and collaborators towards a common goal and provide a means 
of guarding against any action aimed at a divergent goal (e.g. Chevallier, 1994). Coordination 
between its actors and entities therefore occurs in a monolithic and relatively uniform model. 
The reforms associated with NPM, the phenomenon of agentification of the public sector in 
particular, in OECD countries (e.g. Pollitt et al., 1998, Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004, Verhoest et 
al., 2012) or in Switzerland (e.g. Steiner and Huber, 2012, Pasquier and Fivat, 2013), have 
loosened this model, thereby reducing the predictability of its administrative actors (e.g. Spence, 
1997, Torenvlied, 2000, Bendor et al., 2001, van Thiel and Yesilkagit, 2011) – a predictability 
that was formerly guaranteed by the conformity, hierarchical subordination and formal regularing 
methods of the bureaucracy (Grey and Garsten, 2001). 
In its orthodox implementation, an agency is differentiated structurally from the central 
administration, in principle having ad-hoc organs of governance, and disposes of financial and 
human resources that it can manage with a certain degree of autonomy in carrying out, in 
compliance with the principle of specialization, a specific mission entrusted to it. Through the 
distancing of operational entities, the politico-administrative authority and entities become 
distinct actors, whose objectives must be aligned and activities coordinated. 
In this sense, even when the agency is a construction endogenous to the institution that created 
it, the relationship of trust, by analogy, may involve the mechanisms of interorganizational trust, 
and to the extent that the agency and institution are interconnected (Zaheer et al., 1998), in 
interpersonal trust. Trust arises in effective coordination of these two entities that are structurally 
demarcated and have separate purposes, and exchanges and concrete contributions between 
the two parties, and on the basis of repeated interactions between members representing and 
acting on behalf of the respective entity. In the framework of this coordination, trust is intrinsically 
linked to its dialectic with the various modes of control (e.g. Fivat, 2013). 
2. Trust of third parties in the public sector  
Citizens are the primary beneficiaries of services provided by the administration and by public 
bodies, but they are also the primary mandator of these services since they elect political 
authorities.  
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Citizens’ expectations of public authorities and entities are plural and not limited to satisfaction 
with goods and services provided. Their expectations of any given public-service organization 
are concerned not solely with its performance, but, in keeping with the public nature of its 
mandate, also with the means granted to it, its methods, and its purposes. For example, services 
provided by a public medical establishment are not billed in their entirety to beneficiaries, but 
also financed by society through taxes and contributions to compulsory insurance for the entire 
population. That being so, any citizen is legitimately concerned and does not wish to see quality 
care solely because he or she is sick or may need it one day; their motives may also be civic, 
ethical or political (e.g. Dixit, 2002). In this sense, a citizen’s trust in any institution or public 
establishment may be based on characteristics of trustworthiness similar to those proposed 
above: competence (as shown by the quality of care provided, for example), probity (proper 
management of resources, for example) and goodwill (not serving its own interests to the 
detriment of those of the community, for example). 
Nevertheless, direct relationships between a citizen and government or public-service 
authorities are often sporadic or occur from time to time, and reciprocal inter partes trust does 
not appear overriding. Moreover, in the light of these plural expectations, it is possible to 
envisage a shift from trust based on a given relationship between the citizen and a public body 
to an institutional trust, in the meaning of Zucker (1986) or Rousseau et al. (1998) – that “extra-
relational” trust which lends environmental guarantees to social interactions: confidence in the 
justice system, for example. 
What then is the meaning of trust in these relationships? Hardin (2013) considers that the 
general relationship between citizens and government is not one of trust or distrust, but the 
citizens’ expectation of a reliable government perceived as being trustworthy. The decline in 
“trust” observed over recent years should in fact be understood as the reduction in the perceived 
trustworthiness of government; more specifically, an inability to gauge the government’s 
trustworthiness because of a lack of information at the citizen’s disposal. Möllering counters 
these arguments by saying that citizens’ need to trust the government arises in an asymmetry 
of information, in spite of their limited knowledge: “His analysis needs to be applied with caution, 
because a different understanding of trust suggests that the reason Hardin gives for why citizens 
should be unable to trust government is exactly the reason why they have a need to trust 
government: their lack of knowledge.” (2013: 53-54). 
The divergence between these two authors arises from that delicate set of knowledge necessary 
to gauge trustworthiness on one hand, and on the other hand the lack of knowledge that is 
inherent in the need for trust: “[…] the person who knows completely need not trust; while the 
person who knows nothing, can on no rational grounds afford even confidence” (Granovetter, 
1992a: 39, in Blomqvist, 1997: 272). We would add that, more than the unknown, the issue here 
is the unknowable that creates the need, and the necessity, for trust (e.g. Giddens, 1990). 
Uncertainty lies above all in the predictive dimension of trust, positive expectations regarding 
the future behaviour of the object of trust. Trustworthiness, for its part, provides a tangible and 
evaluative basis for the qualities and behaviour of the object of trust up to the present, trust 
including a prescriptive basis for these qualities and behaviours. Hence, if one can postulate a 
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trustworthiness threshold sufficient to allow trust to arise (e.g. Fivat, 2013), the assessment of 
trustworthiness must also be based on sufficient information. 
The relationship between government transparency and citizen trust – dimensions that are 
frequently linked by the media and civil society – lies at the heart of this dilemma: 
a. Does greater transparency lead to greater trust (e.g. Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012)? By offering 
citizens more information about State activity, can the State strengthen its perceived 
trustworthiness, and accordingly, citizens’ trust? 
b. Or does the clamour for transparency testify to a trust deficit? Do demands for transparency 
constrain government action, a kind of sword of Damocles to be employed as a means of 
control after the fact precisely because trust and the corresponding positive expectations 
needed in order to tolerate uncertainty are lacking? 
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Conclusion 
The study of trustworthiness, complementary to trust, allows investigation of the 
determinants that support the emergence of trust and contribute to the “good reasons” 
to trust. With regard to practical applications, although trust, as a psychological state, 
cannot be imposed, the trustee can act on his trustworthiness, and on the 
characteristics and behaviours on which the trustor will base his assessment. The 
proposed analysis model has been empirically developed in the specific framework of 
relations between various agencies and their parent ministry (Fivat, 2013). Its 
relevance has not been tested with regard to the diversity of relationships identified 
between actors both inside and outside the public service. 
The benefits of trust stem from the psychological confidence; the positive expectations 
that it offers regarding the object of trust and, consequently, the concrete effects and 
benefits of these perceived predictability.. In the coordination of the various authorities 
and entities of the public service, the expected benefits of trust ensue from its 
behavioural dimensions and essentially the dialectic of trust and control, inevitably 
raising the question of risk. Equating trust with the intention to take a risk largely 
derives from the heritage and influence of the work of Luhmann (1973, 1979), risk 
arising when a decision involves stakes, a possible gain or loss (Mayer et al., 1995). 
Nevertheless, in the context of relations between citizens and the State, political 
authorities or public administration, the notion of risk carries less weight. In other 
words, although in these relations we find the central elements of trust: 1) positive 
expectations of the other party, 2) a willingness to accept vulnerability in a relationship, 
3) the conditions of interdependence and risk appear to be less relevant. 
Giddens (1990), for example, assumes that the practices of trust are not uniform and 
that hence various conceptualizations of the phenomena may coexist. He also 
proposes a routinized conception of trust: in some circumstances, trust is “much less 
of a ‘leap to commitment“ than a tacit acceptance of circumstances in which other 
alternatives are largely foreclosed” (ibid.: 90). Trust then becomes a “posture”: if one 
relies on one’s experience, or knowledge, and belief in partners’ trustworthiness, on 
regular features of the environment, without systematically envisaging other possible 
alternatives. From this point of view, trust enables a degree of vulnerability to be 
tolerated by letting go of the desire for certainty and systematic verifications: above all 
it forms an attitude that is opposed to distrust and systematic suspicion. 
We can also ponder the various meanings that can be ascribed to trust in these 
different contexts, and the corresponding manifestations of trust. Leaving aside a 
normative position, what are the concrete benefits of citizens’ trust in public 
administration? How does trust manifest in this context? 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Themes associated with the trustworthiness of politico-administrative authority (as principal in an agency relationship). 
Competence Resources of the trustee that are mobilizable (capacities, abilities, knowledge, know-how) and mobilized (results of value for the 
trustor) (adapted from Mayer et al., 1995, Sako and Helper, 1998). 
Expertise This theme deals with the principal’s aptitudes (knowledge, know-how) for providing results of value for the subordinate organization 
as part of coordination (Mayer and Davis, 1999, Mayer et al., 1995, McEvily and Zaheer, 2006). 
Probity Fulfilment of undertakings and duties, and respect for associated or expected standards or values (adapted from Mayer et al., 
1995, Sako and Helper, 1998). 
Consistency This theme deals with the perceived stability of the principal’s expectations and of the explicit and implicit operating rules governing 
the relationship, and with respect for decisions that have been taken, leading to the predictability that is essential for the 
development of trust (e.g. Zaheer et al., 1998). As a foundation of perceived trustworthiness, it refers not only to the consistency 
of the principal (Mayer et al., 1995, McEvily and Zaheer, 2006), but also to fulfilment of promises and corresponding actions (e.g. 
Butler, 1991, Mishra, 1996). The political environment of the study makes this theme particularly sensitive, the adverse effects on 
the trust of agencies of the principal’s “ex post haggling” having been raised by Binderkrantz and Christensen (2009). 
Openness This theme deals with perceived accessibility of the principal, and in particular of information in its possession that is of interest to 
the subordinate organization. In its relational aspect, the quality of communication is one of the most important determining factors 
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in the development of trust (e.g. Anderson and Narus, 1990, Morgan and Hunt, 1994)46. As a foundation of perceived 
trustworthiness, openness is here considered as an expected value or standard in the relationship, a source of probity (e.g. Butler, 
1991).  
Equity This theme refers to the principal’s procedural and distributive fairness (e.g. Das and Teng, 1998), particularly in its arbitration role. 
Particularly since the means made available to subordinate organizations and development priorities depend, to a large extent, on 
the budget allocations decided by the politico-administrative authority. This theme relates to the principal’s probity to the extent 
that here, it is not directly a matter of subordinate organizations’ satisfaction with their needs, but of fairness as a standard of the 
allocation process. 
Goodwill Favourable disposition of the trustee towards the trustor and its interests, with no motive to take selfish advantage thereof (adapted 
from Mayer et al., 1995, Sako and Helper, 1998) 
Defence of interests In the consideration of the interests of the subordinate organization, this theme deals with the principal’s role in representing the 
interests of subordinate organizations to institutional authorities (political, departmental or Federal authorities, for example) where 
immediate access to these authorities does not lie within the formal competence of subordinate organizations, and where the 
principal does not have the competence to take the corresponding decision alone. Essentially, this involves an absence of 
opportunism on the part of the principal where possible (in the absence of subordinate organizations) (Anderson and Narus, 1990, 
Bromiley and Cummings, 1995, Zaheer et al., 1998, McEvily and Zaheer, 2006)47. This theme is distinct from consistency, where 
the emphasis is on the principal’s motive.  
                                                     
46 In the list of Mayer et al. (1995), openness appears not only as one of the principles associated with integrity (e.g. Butler, 1991), but also in the consideration of the 
trustor's interests, benevolence (e.g. Mishra, 1996). 
47 The expectation that an actor will act and negotiate fairly when the possibility for opportunism is present. 
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Adequacy This theme addresses the principal’s concrete responses to the needs of the subordinate organization. It involves 
interorganizational adaptation, through which, adjustments made by partners to better match the needs of cooperation appear as 
incentives for the partners to act in the common interest, rather than serving their own interests. These adaptations also include a 
flexibility and a willingness to adapt or to deviate from the contract when necessary (Das and Teng, 1998). Here we consider the 
role of the principal in its position of authority. These deviations may for example involve adaptation of implementation guidelines 
(as opposed to a “rigid” implementation) that comply with the legal framework, but take into account the reality of the subordinate 
organization. This theme may also consider aspects connected with the means (financial, technical, infrastructure) granted by the 
principal to the subordinate organization, but is different from the distributive fairness associated with the theme of equity, in that 
here the question is essentially the appropriateness for the requirements of the delegated task of the means and tools made 
available by the principal for its execution. 
 
